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ABSTRACT 
 
After a major disturbance, the power system response is highly dependent on 
protection schemes and system dynamics. Improving power systems situational awareness 
requires proper and simultaneous modeling of both protection schemes and dynamic 
characteristics in power systems analysis tools. Historical information and ex-post analysis 
of blackouts reaffirm the critical role of protective devices in cascading events, thereby 
confirming the necessity to represent protective functions in transient stability studies. 
This dissertation is aimed at studying the importance of representing protective relays in 
power system dynamic studies. Although modeling all of the protective relays within 
transient stability studies may result in a better estimation of system behavior, 
representing, updating, and maintaining the protection system data becomes an 
insurmountable task. Inappropriate or outdated representation of the relays may result in 
incorrect assessment of the system behavior. This dissertation presents a systematic 
method to determine essential relays to be modeled in transient stability studies. The 
desired approach should identify protective relays that are critical for various operating 
conditions and contingencies. The results of the transient stability studies confirm that 
modeling only the identified critical protective relays is sufficient to capture system 
behavior for various operating conditions and precludes the need to model all of the 
protective relays. Moreover, this dissertation proposes a method that can be implemented 
to determine the appropriate location of out-of-step blocking relays. During unstable 
power swings, a generator or group of generators may accelerate or decelerate leading to 
voltage depression at the electrical center along with generator tripping. This voltage 
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depression may cause protective relay mis-operation and unintentional separation of the 
system. In order to avoid unintentional islanding, the potentially mis-operating relays 
should be blocked from tripping with the use of out-of-step blocking schemes. Blocking 
these mis-operating relays, combined with an appropriate islanding scheme, help avoid a 
system wide collapse. The proposed method is tested on data from the Western Electricity 
Coordinating Council. A triple line outage of the California-Oregon Intertie is studied. The 
results show that the proposed method is able to successfully identify proper locations of 
out-of-step blocking scheme. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
Major blackouts are the result of a single initiating event combined with an 
inappropriate action or lack of action of essential protective equipments. The single 
initiating event or equipment failure generally involves aging equipment, a cyber-security 
attack, an environmental factor (lightening, earthquake, excessive heat, or tree contact), 
human error, or relay mis-operation. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC) mandates that the N-1 reliability requirement be maintained during power system 
operations and it must be accounted for during planning as well [1]. To meet this 
requirement in real-time, operators check system states for potential N-1 violations (post-
contingency violations) at least once every thirty minutes; this process is known as real-
time contingency analysis. If a contingency is detected, the operator must take appropriate 
action to regain N-1 reliability within thirty minutes. This process ensures that the system 
is able to move from a base-case, pre-contingency setting, survives a single contingency, 
and then regains N-1 reliability [2]-[3].  
Ensuring that the system is N-1 and N-1-1 reliable is not easy as the actual operating 
state of the system is not always the same as predicted. Therefore, depending upon the 
state of the system and severity of the event, the system might face an emergency 
condition, especially during peak load hours. In this stage, if proper automatic control 
actions or appropriate operator response are not taken fast enough, the initiating failure 
may cause additional failures and could also result in a cascading outage. As an example, 
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in the case of a transmission line outage, the alternative paths may become overloaded 
after the initiating contingency leading to dynamic and stability issues. These dynamic 
issues may cause further mis-operation of system elements resulting in additional outages 
and imbalance between load and generation. Without preventive and corrective actions, 
the imbalance between load and generation will lead to acceleration or deceleration of a 
generator or group of generators, which in turn may cause inappropriate islanding and, 
ultimately, a blackout. In addition, although in rare situations, two unrelated contingencies 
might happen sequentially (within a short time difference) or simultaneously. This 
simultaneous occurrence may increase the speed at which the cascading outage propagates 
and it is also likely to increase the severity of the outage.  
For instance, the major 2003 Italian blackout started with a tree flash over on a tie line 
between Italy and Switzerland. The automatic breaker control did not reclose the tie line. 
This initial outage caused an overload on parallel tie lines. While the first outage was still 
not cleared, another 380 kV tie line connecting Italy and Switzerland, tripped out due to 
tree contact. This cascading trend continued and, finally, the Italian system lost 
synchronism with the rest of Europe. The tie lines between Italy and France tripped due to 
distance relay operation on these lines. The same happened for the 220 kV lines 
connecting Italy and Austria. In addition, a 380 kV tie line, which is between Italy and 
Slovenia, tripped due to overload. With a shortage of 6400 MW of power, the frequency 
dropped rapidly resulting in operation of under-frequency relays of several generating 
units. Therefore, the entire Italian system collapsed, causing a nationwide blackout [4]. 
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1.2 Instability during contingency conditions 
Identifying the initiating events quickly and minimizing the impact of those events is 
the best way to avoid cascading outages. If the proper corrective actions are not taken 
quickly, the initial event may lead to system stability issues. The dynamic states leading to 
system wide collapse are categorized as the following: 
Transient angular instability: The initial disturbance can cause load-generation 
imbalance in a region; due to difference in the rate of change of mechanical and electrical 
power, the generator rotor angles may deviate in response to the disturbance. This 
deviation might be followed by loss of synchronism between different groups of 
generators, which is also known as an out-of-step (OOS) condition. As the region loses 
synchronism, the relative rotor angles separate, which results in different groupings of 
generators. The voltage at the electrical center of these groups will then be depressed, 
resulting in protective relays detecting what is thought to be a fault and, thus, the 
protective relay systems will trip additional transmission lines. Therefore, all of the 
electrical paths between the groups of the generators may trip, which can result in islands. 
While it is preferred to form islands due to the loss of system wide synchronism and the 
result of generator groupings, those islands must be formed with an appropriate supply 
and demand balance. With the protective relay systems tripping lines that have depressed 
voltages at the electrical center, it is unlikely that the resulting islands will have the 
required load-generation balance. Without taking proper actions, these separations result 
in unintentional islands with load-generation imbalances that will cause additional 
generator trippings leading to a cascading outage. These outages happen in the order of a 
4 
 
few seconds [4]. Proper OOS protection schemes are essential to avoid system separation 
at undesired locations. This issue is explained in more detail in Chapter 2.  
Small signal instability: In a weakened power system, large power transfers lead to 
uncontrollable growing electromechanical oscillation on the tie lines. This event also 
results in the separation of the system into different generator groups. This event takes 
several to tens of seconds [4]. 
Voltage instability and collapse: Transient voltage instability is a very fast 
phenomenon that may results in voltage collapse, especially during peak load conditions.  
Without implementing proper control actions, any of these initiating events may lead 
to separation of the system into several islands. Then, the situation exacerbates due to 
load-generation imbalance and unforeseen frequency response in the uncontrolled 
islands. Finally, a point of no return is reached and the cascading events are not 
manageable. This series of unmanageable failures ultimately leads to a major blackout 
[4]. Figure 1.1 provides a generic description of grid operations during and after 
contingencies. 
1.3 Relay mis-operation 
Historical information from outages shows that a significant percentage of 
disturbances are caused by relay mis-operation (also known as hidden failures) [5]-[6]. 
Although blackouts involve various factors (such as human error, weather related events 
and device failure), protection systems failure is a critical factor. Hidden failures may 
occur when the system is under stress after an initial event and may exacerbate the power 
system state.  
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Heavily loaded transmission lines cause the apparent impedance characteristic to fall 
inside zone 3 of the relay setting. Therefore, the relays trip the lines. This tripping happens 
while no fault is actually present. As a result, the alternative transmission paths will be 
overloaded. This process continues, weakens the system, and potentially leads to blackout.  
 
Figure 1.1 General Sequence of Events Leading to Blackout [4] 
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Furthermore, the initiating event may result in a power swing, which can cause the 
apparent impedance to locate inappropriately within the distance relay characteristic, 
resulting in a relay mis-operation. Reference [7] discusses relay apparent impedance 
trajectory during unstable power swing. 
Therefore, performing a proper and precise stability study, while modeling protective 
relays, is essential to find the potential mis-operating relays; using the result of such a 
study, an appropriate OOS protection scheme can be designed to prevent relay mis-
operations. 
While modeling all of the protective relays within transient stability studies may result 
in a better estimation of system behavior, mis-representation of relays or outdated relay 
models may result in a false assessment of the system behavior. Thus, there is a pressing 
challenge to not only model protection systems within stability studies in order to get 
better assessments of system behavior but also identify which subset of protection systems 
are the most critical to model in order to maintain a practical limitation.  
1.4 Scope of work 
This dissertation aims to address these real and challenging questions. First, this 
research proposes a method that accurately finds the potential relay mis-operation 
locations during a power swing. The proposed method can be implemented during power 
systems planning studies. Using the results of transient stability planning studies, the 
proposed method is able to successfully identify the essential locations of OOS blocking 
relays. 
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Second, this research introduces a network partitioning method, which successfully 
identifies the essential distance relays to be modeled in transient stability studies. This 
network partitioning model uses the result of transient stability studies for identified 
critical contingencies to specify the most vulnerable distance relays to the unstable power 
swing in the system. These relays are considered as the critical relays to be modeled in a 
transient stability study. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. A literature review on power 
swings, protection systems, and stability analysis is presented in Chapter 2. The 
importance of modeling protective relays within transient stability studies is discussed in 
Chapter 3. A method to locate electrical centers of the system is presented in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 also illustrates the results of this proposed method. Chapter 5 presents the 
proposed network partitioning model for identifying critical protective relays. Chapter 5 
also demonstrates the results of the proposed network partitioning method. Chapter 6 is 
allocated to conclusions of this dissertation.  
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Chapter 2: Power Swings and Out-of-step Protection 
 
Sudden changes in the state of a power system, such as a change in power generation, 
a large change in load, faults, or transmission line switching, can cause an imbalance 
between mechanical power input and electrical power output of generation units since the 
change in mechanical power input is much slower than the change in electrical power 
output. This mismatch causes an acceleration or deceleration of the generation units. Such 
disturbances may lead to a change of the generators’ rotor angles relative to each other. 
These changes or oscillations in generator rotor angles impose stable or unstable power 
flow swings on transmission lines. Power swings might be observed by protective relays 
as three-phase faults and cause unwanted system wide separation as a result of relay mis-
operation. The potential load-generation imbalance in these unintentional islands may lead 
to frequency drop situations and, eventually, a system wide blackout. Ideally, the system 
should be separated at the desired points in order to maintain the load-generation balance 
in each island. To accomplish this proper separation scheme, out-of-step blocking relays 
should block the tripping of the transmission lines in which power swings occur. In 
addition, the out-of-step tripping protective scheme should trip the transmission lines at 
the proper locations. Although maintaining load-generation balance in each island might 
seem unrealistic, this goal can be achieved by implementing a proper load-generation 
shedding plan. This research is aimed at studying the impact of power swings in various 
protective relays, the importance of including various protective relays in power system 
dynamic studies, and determining the critical protective relays for power system dynamic 
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studies. Moreover, this research proposes a method that can be implemented to determine 
the appropriate location for installing OOS blocking relays. Relevant literature is reviewed 
in this chapter. 
2.1 Rotor angle stability and loss of synchronism 
A simple two-machine system, which is shown in Figure 2.1, is considered in this 
subsection in order to study generator behaviors after a disturbance. It is very common to 
reduce a power system to this two-machine system representation; while such an 
approximation is frequently useful to replicate the system behavior and performance, it is 
important to keep in mind such an approach is not an exact equivalent in general. Figure 
2.2 shows the electric power-angle curve of one of these equivalent generators. Moreover, 
the mechanical power input of this equivalent generator, mP , is shown in this figure. 
 
Figure 2.1 One-Line Diagram of a Two-Machine System 
 
Figure 2.2 Power Angle Curve 
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After occurrence of a contingency, the transfer capability of the system reduces while 
the rotor angle remains the same ( 1δ ) due to inertia. This is shown in Figure 2.3 as the 
transition between point A and point B. At point B, the electric output power is lower that 
the mechanical input power (power from the prime mover). This imbalance causes the 
rotor angle to accelerate till it reaches 2δ , shown by the transition between point B and 
point C. In Figure 2.3, A1 represents the kinetic energy of the generator. After the clearing 
of the fault by the protection system, the transfer capability is improved, which allows the 
machine to transfer more power at angle 2δ  (shown as the transition between point C and 
point D in Figure 2.3). At this point, the electric power output is higher than the 
mechanical power input, which causes the rotor to decelerate. However, the rotor angle 
continues to increase due to the rotor inertia. If the excess energy (represented by A1 in 
Figure 2.3) is not used up before electric power output decreases below the prime mover 
input, the rotor angle will keep increasing and the machine will lose synchronism with the 
rest of the system.  
1δ 2δ
 
Figure 2.3 Power Angle Curve for Various Network Conditions 
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In prior literature [8]-[9], it is explained that if the angle reaches the critical value for 
maintaining stability (commonly considered as 120 degrees) and is still increasing, it is 
most likely that the system will not reach the equilibrium (area A1 is equal to area A2) and 
will lose synchronism. The critical angle for maintaining stability changes based upon the 
system condition and the contingency. However, [8] and [10] explain that the likelihood of 
recovering from swing, which has exceeded 120 degrees, is marginal. Therefore, 120 
degrees is usually accepted as a proper basis for setting out-of-step protection. 
2.2 Stable and unstable power swings 
In a stable power swing, the power system finds a new stable operational condition 
with a balance between load and generation. In an unstable swing, the generators’ relative 
rotor angles continue to separate; this almost surely results in no new balance condition 
being found. Unstable power swing leads to loss of synchronism between different groups 
of generators in different areas of the system. During loss of synchronism, a generator or 
group of generators slip poles, which is also referred to as an out-of-step condition. Pole 
slipping is a condition whereby terminal voltage angles of a generator or a group of 
generators exceed 180 degrees relative to the rest of the interconnected power system. 
After loss of synchronism, the areas should be separated quickly to avoid a possible 
collapse of the entire system. The system should be separated at some locations such that 
each of the separated areas can maintain a power balance considering the appropriate 
generation or load shedding plan [8].  
Power swings can result in desired or undesired relay operation in the network. The 
swing impedance characteristic might enter relay impedance zones during a dynamic 
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swing condition of the system resulting in an undesired relay operation. The unwanted 
relay operation may exacerbate the power system operating conditions and cause 
unwanted tripping of power system elements and deteriorate the system operating 
conditions leading to a cascading outage. Therefore, protective relays should be 
temporarily prohibited from unintentional tripping during stable or unstable dynamic 
conditions in order to avoid the system being separated at random locations and producing 
undesired islands. Modern distance relays are usually equipped with blocking 
functionality to prevent unintentional distance relay operations during stable or unstable 
power swings. A well-designed protective relaying scheme should differentiate between 
faults and power swings and block the tripping operation during power swings. In 
addition, faults occurring during power swings should be recognized by distance relays 
[11].  
The transmission line protection system is required to distinguish line faults from 
power swings and operate appropriately. The rate of change of the swing impedance is 
usually used as a metric to differentiate between faults and power swings. During a fault 
condition, the voltage, current, and load characteristics change from their normal value to 
the value capable of triggering the relay instantly. However, for a power swing, these 
values change slowly from the normal value [12]. The basis for this slow change is the 
fact that it takes time for the rotor angle to advance due to inertia. Therefore, the rate of 
change of the swing impedance is slow.  
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There are also several other approaches presented in the literature with the purpose of 
distinguishing between a power swing and a fault condition. Some of these methods are 
presented in this chapter. 
Relay mis-operations during unstable power swings can cause uncontrolled separation 
of parts of power systems. Uncontrolled separation during an OOS condition might result 
in equipment damage, pose a safety concern for utility personnel, and cause cascading 
outages and the interruption of electricity in larger areas of the power system. Thus, a 
properly controlled separation scheme is essential to reduce the impacts of the disturbance. 
A well-designed separation (islanding) scheme should successfully recognize stable 
swings from unstable swings and initiate the process of separation at predetermined 
locations at proper values of voltage angle differences.  
OOS protection prohibits mis-operation of relays and separates the system at 
appropriate locations with the goal of minimizing loss of load and maintaining maximum 
service continuity. Therefore, blocking and tripping are two main functions related to 
power swings. Blocking prohibits the relays, which are prone to operate during stable or 
unstable swings, from operating. The OOS blocking function should be accompanied by 
OOS tripping schemes. This is accomplished with the application of a transfer trip 
scheme. Moreover, line reclosing should be blocked after the OOS tripping function is 
invoked [11].  
An OOS condition imposes many risks to power systems if the OOS protection is not 
designed appropriately or malfunctions. In order to maintain system security, OOS 
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conditions should be recognized and mitigated properly. Some of the associated risks of a 
stable and an unstable power swing are as follows [11]: 
• Transient recovery voltage (TRV) causing breaker failure: an OOS condition may 
impose a TRV challenge to the circuit breaker. The worst case occurs when the 
voltage angles across the breaker are 180 degrees apart. It is very important for the 
OOS tripping function to avoid tripping when the angle difference between islands is 
close to 180 degrees. Tripping during this condition imposes a high amount of stress 
on the circuit breakers and can cause breaker damage. Appropriate caution should be 
taken in designing the OOS tripping to avoid breaker failure. There are two different 
methods of out-of-step tripping: trip on the way in (TOWI) and trip on the way out 
(TOWO). TOWI trips the line when the swing impedance enters the OOS tripping 
characteristic. This approach imposes breaker stress as it issues the line tripping 
signals when the phase angle difference approaches 180 degrees. TOWO trips the 
line when the swing impedance exits the OOS tripping characteristic. TOWO has the 
advantage of tripping when the system is close to being in-phase (i.e., the angle 
difference is reducing). However, TOWI is necessary in some systems in order to 
prevent intense voltage dips and loss of load [8]. Reference [8] also explains that 
TOWI is helpful for large systems where the relative movement of the two systems 
is slow. Moreover, TOWO has the risk of transmission line thermal damage. 
• Isolating load and generation: without proper OOS protection scheme, the system 
may sectionalize into uncontrolled islands. Load-generation imbalance in each island 
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might result in a widespread outage. Therefore, appropriate OOS function and 
methods to coordinate load and generation shedding should be implemented. 
• Equipment damage: transmission disturbances might result in pole slipping of a 
synchronous generator, which creates thermal and mechanical stress on the 
generator. These phenomena may cause physical damage and reduce the life of the 
machine. 
• Cascading line tripping: unintentional tripping of transmission lines during stable 
power swings should be blocked by protective relays equipped with power swing 
detection features. Undesired line breaker tripping weakens the system and may 
result in additional line tripping; this series of tripping may cause cascading outages 
of lines. The NERC standards do not allow such cascading tripping [13]. Therefore, 
protective relays with proper power swing detection features should be implemented. 
• Unwanted generator tripping: the proper separation scheme should be implemented 
during unstable swings. Failure to trip a line may result in pole slipping of the 
generator and may cause cascading outages in the system.  
Out-of-step protection schemes should be designed to avoid these risks. The 
fundamental objectives of out-of-step protection systems are [9] and [14]: 
• Block tripping at all locations for stable power swings. 
• Separate the system during out-of-step conditions. 
• Control separation in order to maintain the load-generation balance at each separated 
area considering proper load/generation shedding. 
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• Block tripping or reclosing at one end of any line, which has tripped because of an 
out-of-step condition. 
• Initiate tripping while the two systems are less than 120 degrees apart in order to 
reduce breaker stress. 
• Minimize damage of out-of-step condition by considering the following alternatives: 
− Utilize high-speed relaying. 
− Utilize high-speed excitation system on generators. 
− Equip all generators with loss-of-field relays. 
− Provide sufficient transmission capability. 
− Trip generators on the loss of critical lines. 
− Apply generator braking resistors or inserting series capacitors for critical 
faults. 
− Utilize fast valving of turbines to control over-speed properly. 
− Utilize independent pole tripping to increase power flow through the fault 
point and reduce the separation during the fault. 
These out-of-step protection requirements are difficult to achieve. Some tradeoffs may 
be necessary to avoid a blackout. For instance, the system operator may need to curtail 
some portion of load or generation in order to avoid frequency drop leading to a cascading 
outage. The utility practice for out-of-step protection is listed in [9], [14], and [15]: 
• Implementation of the line relays to initiate out-of-step protection. 
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• Utilization of generators loss-of-field relays to trip generators during out-of-step 
conditions. 
• Restriction of relay trip sensitivity at higher power factor. 
• Blocking the relay tripping at selected locations. 
• Blocking the line reclosing after out-of-step tripping. 
• Initiating tripping using relays designed for out-of-step tripping. 
2.3 Out-of-step protection  
Power swings are classified to have a local mode or an inter-area mode. A local mode 
power swing represents a generator swinging with respect to the rest of the system. Inter-
area power swings are the oscillations of a group of generators against other groups. 
During an inter-area power swing, the protective relays of the transmission lines observe 
the power swing. During a local mode power swing, the local protective relays, e.g. 
protective relays of the out-of-step generator and its step-up transformer, observe the 
power swing. The protective relays, which are involved in local and inter-area power 
swings, are reviewed separately in the remainder of this section.  
2.3.1 Impact of inter-area mode power swings on protection systems 
Pole slipping of groups of generators, i.e., 180 degree separation, causes a zero 
magnitude voltage at the electrical center of the system. At the electrical center, conditions 
identical to a three-phase short circuit will be observed by the nearby relay, which will trip 
unless it is blocked from tripping. These relays are the potential locations for OOS 
blocking relays. 
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As mentioned before, the separation of the accelerating and decelerating parts of the 
system should take place at the proper points in order to maintain load-generation balance 
as much as possible. Figure 2.4 shows a simple system. Although breaker 1 might observe 
the power swing, this is not a proper separation point; this unintentional separation will 
cause at least 5 MVA of load shedding due to the lack of available generation capacity. 
This breaker should be blocked from tripping and the system should be separated at 
breaker 2 or breaker 3; in this situation, generator B needs to increase its output by 1 MVA 
and generator A needs to reduce its output by 1 MVA to serve the demand properly.  
 
Figure 2.4 Generation and Load Balance during Out-of-Step Protection 
Loss of synchronism affects the protective relays of the system. Some of the relays do 
not respond to the loss of synchronism, while others, such as distance relays, may trip. The 
out-of-step condition is a balance phenomenon; therefore, the main focus is on phase 
relaying. In the following subsections, different types of protective relays are described 
briefly and the impacts of power swing on these relays are studied. 
2.3.1.1 Effects of power swings on overcurrent relays 
Overcurrent relays operate if the current measured at the relay location exceeds a 
predefined value. These relays will be affected by out-of-step conditions. This condition is 
explained here for the system of Figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.5 Impacts of Out-of-Step Condition on Overcurrent Relay 
The overcurrent relay located at the point shown in the Figure 2.5 is designed to 
protect this line during a fault. The fault current, in case of fault at X, can be calculated as 
LL ZVI 1= . In the case of a power swing, 180=δ , this current can be calculated as 
LL ZVI 12= (assuming 21 VV = ). This current is twice of the fault current. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the current during the out-of-step condition exceeds the pickup settings 
of these relays, which causes the relays to respond to the out-of-step condition. In 
addition, the current during a stable power swing is higher than the normal current; 
therefore, these relays may trip during a stable power swing. In fact, one of the 
shortcomings of these protective relays is their potential tripping during a stable power 
swing [14]. 
2.3.1.2 Effects of power swings on differential relays 
Differential relays respond to the difference between the input and output values of the 
protected device. These relays measure and compare the quantities (e.g., current) at two 
points; if these value are different, a fault condition would be detected and the tripping 
signal will be sent. Existing differential relaying is used for the protection of generators, 
transformers, buses, and lines. These protective relays do not respond to power swings. 
During a power swing, the current flows through the power element; therefore, these 
relays are not triggered by the power swing. If the swing locus is passing through the 
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element, which is protected by differential relays, and tripping is desired, a backup or 
supplementary relay should be used. 
2.3.1.3 Effects of power swings on distance relays 
A distance relay measures the electrical distance between the relay location and the 
fault point. These relays respond to voltage, current, and angles between voltage and 
current. These quantities can be evaluated in terms of relay impedance, which is 
proportional to the distance to the fault. 
These relays are usually set to trip if a fault occurs within a fractional distance h of the 
line from the relay location (Figure 2.6). This fraction is referred to as the “reach setting”, 
which means that the relay will trip without any time delay if a fault occurs in this portion 
of the line. The relays will trip with a programmed time delay in the case that the fault is 
beyond the reach point. If a fault occurs at the reach point, the impedance, which can be 
observed at the relay A, is as follows, 
L
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Figure 2.6 Reach Point of Distance Relay 
The tripping threshold (without programmed time delay) of such a relay is expressed 
in (2.2). This equation confirms that if a fault occurs after the reach point, the relay A will 
not trip without a time delay. 
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LR hZZ ≤  (2.2) 
The tripping criteria of these relays are not dependent on the system operational 
condition or network structure changes (transmission maintenance scheduling or 
transmission switching). It is a common practice to set the reach point (distance h ) at 80% 
to 90%. For the faults beyond this point, relay B trips first (relay A trips after a time 
delay). This practice leads to sequential tripping and helps with relay coordination. 
However, sequential tripping is slower than simultaneous tripping, which makes 
sequential tripping undesirable for some transmission lines. In particular, a distance relay 
may operate falsely depending on the fault impedance, the impedance behind the relay, 
and the external impedance. Distance relays can be designed with various characteristics, 
which are shown in Figure 2.7 (a)-(e) [16]. 
During a fault, the relay will trip the line if the impedance seen by the relay enters the 
relay impedance characteristic. These relays are one of the most common types of 
protection systems for the transmission network. The following features should be 
considered about various distance relay characteristics [16]: 
• The impedance relay characteristic is not directional, i.e., trips for the fault behind 
the relay. If a directional characteristic is desirable, the supervision from a 
directional unit should be provided. 
• The mho relay is inherently directional. 
• The reactance characteristic defines the reach point clearly. However, these 
characteristics trip for faults behind the relay. Therefore, a supervision of a 
directional unit is required in order to achieve a directional behavior. Moreover, 
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these types of relays may trip for normal load without implementing the supervisory 
directional unit. 
• The blinder characteristic narrow down the relay operation area. However, these 
characteristics allow tripping for faults beyond the reach point. Therefore, 
supervision from a different characteristic is desirable.  
The relay setting for distance relays is not difficult and relay coordination is practical. 
In addition, the response time of these relays are usually short (around 1 cycle). 
LhZ
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Figure 2.7 Various Distance Relay Characteristic and Zone: (a) Impedance 
Characteristic; (b) Blinder Characteristic; (c) Reactance Characteristic; (d) 
Modified Impedance or Offset Mho Characteristic; (e) Lens Characteristic; (f) Mho 
Characteristic Zones 
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As mentioned before, distance relays are usually set to cover 80%-90% of the line 
length. These relays should also be equipped with another characteristic in order to cover 
the rest of the line as well as some portion of the neighboring line. Therefore, these relays 
are usually set as a package with 3 relaying zones. Figure 2.7 (f) shows the three zones of 
a mho characteristic. Figure 2.8 shows the coordination of these relaying zones. Zone 1 
usually is set to respond without any time delay. This zone covers 80%-90% of the line 
length. The impedance setting of zone 2 protection should be at least 120% of the 
protected line length. This setting should not overreach the zone of the adjacent 
downstream line. In Figure 2.8, zone 2 covers 100% of the first line as well as the 50% of 
the next line. The suggested time delay for this zone is 0.25 seconds plus the adjacent 
breaker opening time. Zone 3 is a back-up for the relay on the adjacent line; if the relay of 
the adjacent line fails to open, this zone responds. In Figure 2.8, this zone covers the 
adjacent line and reaches 25% of the second adjacent line. The time delay of this zone is 
usually set at 1-2 seconds. Occasionally, zone 3 settings are set to observe faults in the 
backward direction instead of the forward direction [16].  
 
Figure 2.8 Transmission Lines Protected by Distance Relays 
When the swing impedance enters the distance relay characteristic during a power 
swing, the relay will operate. Whether these relays will complete their operation and trip 
the line depends on the amount of time it takes for the swing locus to traverse the relay 
24 
 
characteristic and the length of the line. If the power swing is stable and the system will 
recover, the swing locus may leave the relay impedance characteristic before the breaker 
or relay characteristic time delay is exhausted. Moreover, the length of the line and its 
impedance with respect to the system impedance are other important terms. If the line 
impedance is small in comparison to the system impedance, the system will trip during a 
power swing that the system would not recover from. In order to show this fact 
graphically, the system of Figure 2.9 is considered. Figure 2.10 shows the relay impedance 
and swing characteristic while line impedance is small in comparison to the system 
impedance. In this case, the swing locus enters the relay impedance characteristic when 
the system angular difference is well passed 120 degrees [10]. In this case, the relay will 
operate due to any of the zones depending on the time delay of zone 2 or zone 3 as well as 
the operating time of the breaker. System separation at this point may not be desirable; 
therefore, the protective relays should be blocked from tripping. Reference [14] specifies 
that the likelihood of the system recovering from a power swing is almost zero after the 
angular difference passes 90 degrees.  
 
Figure 2.9 Equivalent System used to Study Loss of Synchronism Characteristic 
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Figure 2.10 Effect of Loss of Synchronism on Distance Relays: Small Line 
Impedance in Comparison to System Impedance [10] 
If the line impedance is large in comparison to the system impedance, the relay may 
trip for any stable power swing. Figure 2.11 shows such a case; two zones are shown in 
this figure for the sake of clarity. The swing locus enters zone 2 of the relay before the 
system angle difference reaches 90 degrees. The swing impedance enters zone 1 before 
the angular difference reaches 120 degrees. In this case, either the relay should be blocked 
from tripping the line or if desired to permit tripping, the relay characteristic area should 
be restricted using a supplementary characteristic such as blinders [10]. 
The traverse time of a swing locus inside a relay zone can be calculated as (2.3). If this 
traverse time is greater than the relay zone time delay plus the circuit breaker time delay, 
the system relay will trip the line. 2δ  and 1δ  are shown in Figure 2.12 and S  represents 
slip in degrees per second [10]. 
S
T 12
δδ −
=   (2.3) 
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Figure 2.11 Effect of Loss of Synchronism on Distance Relays: Large Line 
Impedance in Comparison to System Impedance [10] 
1δ
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Figure 2.12 Method for Determining Relay Operation Tendency during Loss of 
Synchronism [10] 
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2.3.1.4 Under-frequency and under-voltage load shedding relays during power swings 
Unlike most of the previously discussed relays, under-frequency load shedding and 
under-voltage load shedding relays do not get engaged in power swings. However, in case 
of unintentional islanding, under-frequency load shedding and under-voltage load 
shedding relays may operate due to the potential imbalance in each island. These relays 
would shed pre-defined blocks of loads when the voltage drop or the frequency drop 
exceeds the set points of these relays. These pre-defined blocks of load may not be 
suitable for the uncontrolled islands, e.g., the block of load shedding may be more than the 
amount of load-generation imbalance. Therefore, the operation of these relays may 
exacerbate the system condition and result in more tension during emergency conditions. 
The impacts of modeling these relays during a transient stability study are shown in 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
2.3.2 Impact of local mode power swings on protection systems 
2.3.2.1 Out-of-step tripping of generators 
The OOS protection of transmission lines started before OOS protection for 
generators. After the United States 1965 northeastern blackout, the necessity of protecting 
generators via OOS protection schemes was acknowledged [17]. Most of other generators’ 
protective schemes are unable to protect the generators during out-of-step conditions. The 
loss-of-excitation relays provides some degrees of protection for the generators during 
out-of-step condition; however, these protective relays are not able to detect out-of-step 
conditions for all operational conditions. 
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In [14], the impact of using loss-of-field protection for out-of-step sensing is 
explained; [14] then concludes that using other protection schemes for detecting OOS 
conditions is less appropriate than those specifically designed for out-of-step relaying for 
generators. Loss-of-field relays are not equipped with proper out-of-step detection 
schemes. Furthermore, the responses required for these two different conditions are 
dissimilar, which leads to instability. This reference further explains that the easiest 
location to detect out-of-step condition is at generators’ locations. However, the 
appropriate transfer trip signal should be sent to the desired separation location. 
The OOS protective relays for generators observe and initiate when the electrical 
center of a power system disturbance passes through the generators’ unit step-up 
transformers or the generators. These protective relays may also be essential if the 
electrical center is through the transmission system and transmission system relays are 
slow or unable to detect the out-of-step condition [18]. Figure 2.13 shows the relay 
characteristic of these relays. TX , SX , and dX ′  represent generator step-up transformer 
reactance, system reactance, and generator transient reactance respectively. cθ represents 
the critical switching angle. This critical angle should be calculated via stability studies. 
Without performing a stability study, cθ  is usually assumed to be around 120 degrees. 
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Figure 2.13 Generator Out-of-Step Tripping Scheme 
Reference [10] specifies that, as a rule, it is not a recommended practice to perform 
out-of-step tripping for generators. Instead, it is more desirable to separate the system at 
appropriate locations in order to keep the load-generation balance. The generators are 
preferred to remain connected and be ready to resynchronize the system in each island 
after separation. This reference explains that there are definite exceptions to this rule and 
the consequences of this tripping should be thoroughly studied.  
2.3.3 Power swing detection methods 
Early detection of a power swing is very important due to two reasons. First, a power 
swing may lead to mis-operation of several protection schemes: generation protection, 
directional comparison schemes, distance relays, phase overcurrent, and/or phase 
overvoltage. Therefore, a power swing should be detected soon and appropriate out-of-
step blocking schemes should be implemented. Second, in case of an out-of-step 
condition, a network separation scheme is needed in order to avoid a system wide 
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collapse. Thus, an out-of-step tripping scheme should be implemented [19]. Several power 
swing detection methods are presented in literature. Each of these methods has their own 
advantages and drawbacks [19]. Some of these methods are reviewed here. 
2.3.3.1 Conventional rate of change of impedance method 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the swing impedance locus travels in the 
impedance plane slowly. This feature distinguishes the power swing from fault during 
which the impedance changes from a typical load level to the fault level instantly. The 
conventional power swing detection methods are based on this rate of change of 
impedances.  
Blinder Schemes: 
Figure 2.14 shows a single-blinder scheme. The time interval between right blinder 
and left blinder is recorded; if this time interval is greater than the time setting, a power 
swing is detected. This method is functional for the trip on the way out scheme. A power 
swing blocking scheme cannot be achieved by this method as the swing locus passes the 
relay impedance characteristic before it meets the left blinder. In order to overcome this 
flaw, the dual-blinder scheme, which is shown in Figure 2.15, can be used. In this case, the 
time interval, between the inner and outer blinders, is measured and compared with a 
time-setting. If this time interval ( T∆ ) is larger than the time setting, the power swing is 
detected. This scheme also allows tripping on the way in. 
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Figure 2.14 Single Blinder Characteristic 
T∆
 
Figure 2.15 Dual Blinder Characteristic 
Concentric characteristic scheme: 
The concentric scheme works the same as the dual-blinder scheme. A timer will be 
triggerd after the swing impedance locus crosses the outer characteristic. If the swing 
impedance locus crosses the inner characteristic after a set time delay, a power swing will 
be detected. Figure 2.16 shows some of these characteristic. 
However, it is not easy to determine the appropriate settings for either the dual-blinder 
or the concentric scheme. In order to guarantee a proper out-of-step blocking scheme, the 
inner blinder must be located outside of the largest relay impedance characteristic for 
which the blocking is required. In addition, the outer blinder should be set outside of the 
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load region in order to avoid incorrect blocking operation caused by heavy load. It is 
difficult to achieve such a proper setting when the line impedance is large in comparison 
to the network impedance.  
 
 
(a) 
  
(b) 
 
  
(c) 
  
(d)  
Figure 2.16 Concentric Characteristic of Various Shapes 
In order to set these protective relays correctly, several stability studies are required. 
The fastest power swing should be determined and the blinder time delay should be set 
accordingly. The rate of slip between two individually synchronized systems is a function 
of the acceleration torque and system inertia. A relay cannot recognize the slip analytically 
due to the complexity of the system. By performing stability studies and analyzing the 
results, an average slip can be determined. However, the slip usually changes after the first 
slip cycle. Therefore, a fixed impedance separation between the blinders and a fixed time 
delay might not be adequate for an appropriate setting of the out-of-step blocking. 
Moreover, for a complex power system, it is very hard to calculate the source impedances 
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in order to establish the blinder and out-of-step blocking scheme. These impedances 
change with network topology, commitment of an additional generation unit, or other 
network elements. The source impedances can also change during a disturbance. If the 
source impedance were to stay constant, the blocking and tripping scheme setting would 
have been trivial. Usually, very detailed stability studies for various contingencies are 
needed in order to find the best fit for equivalent source impedance and out-of-step 
protection settings. 
2.3.3.2 Non-conventional power swing detection method 
Continuous impedance calculation: 
Continuous impedance calculation is presented in [20]. This method is based on 
monitoring impedance progression in the complex plane. The criteria for detecting a 
power swing in this method are: continuity, monotony, and smoothness. Continuity 
confirms the motion of the trajectory, i.e., the trajectory should not be motionless; X∆  and 
R∆  (in Figure 2.17) should be greater than a threshold. Monotony confirms that the 
trajectory does not change direction. Smoothness checks that there are no abrupt changes 
in the trajectory. If these criteria are fulfilled for six sequential calculations, a power swing 
suspicion is established. This method usually implements a concentric characteristic as 
complementary. This concentric characteristic is designed to pick the very slow 
impedance trajectory movements (<5 ohm/second) during a swing. After the trajectory 
enters the concentric characteristic, a timer is started. A power swing is detected if the 
timer elapses before the fault detection zone is reached [20]. The advantage of this method 
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is that it does not require any settings. This method is also able to handle a slip frequency 
up to 7 Hz. 
 
Figure 2.17 Continuous Impedance Calculation [20] 
Continuous calculation of incremental current: 
This method is based on the fact that current and voltage experience large variations 
during power swings. The difference between the present observed current value and the 
previous sampled value are used to detect power swing conditions. A power swing is 
detected if this difference is more than 5 percent of the nominal current and this condition 
is observed for 3 cycles. Figure 2.18 shows this scheme. This detection can trigger a 
power swing blocking scheme. An additional delta current detector is also used to detect a 
new step change of the current beyond the power swing. This additional detector is used to 
recognize the fault condition and remove the blocking scheme (Figure 2.19) [21]. 
I∆
I∆
 
Figure 2.18 Continuous Calculation of Incremental Current [21] 
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Irms ∆  
Figure 2.19 PSB and Removal of Blocking by Fault Detector 2 due to a Fault [21] 
Continuous calculation of incremental current can detect very fast power swings that 
are difficult to detect using the traditional methods, specifically for heavy load conditions. 
However, the detection of a very slow slip (below 0.1 Hz) is hard since current may 
change less than 5% of the nominal current between two cycles [21]. 
R-Rdot out-of-step scheme: 
This method was devised for the Pacific 500 kV intertie and installed in the early 
1980s. The rate of change of impedance is used in order to detect an out-of-step condition. 
A control variable U  is defined by (2.4) [22]-[23], 
t
Z
11
d
d
T)ZZ(U +−=  (2.4) 
where Z  is the apparent impedance magnitude at the relay location. 1Z  and 1T  are two 
settings that are derived from system studies; 1Z  is the impedance of the swing that is to 
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be tripped and T1 is the slope that represents Rdot/R. Out-of-step tripping relays will 
operate if U  becomes negative. If we neglect the derivative part of (2.4), the control 
characteristic will be similar to the conventional method. Reference [19] explains that for 
a conventional out-of-step tripping, the relay will trip when the impedance observed at the 
relay location is less than a specified value. The Rdot/R method is a combination of this 
conventional method with a rate of change of the impedance observed at the relay 
location. Considering the derivative part of (2.4), the tripping signal will be achieved 
faster when the impedance changes at a higher rate (when the derivative is negative). For a 
high separation rate, 
t
Z
d
d
 would be a large negative value causing earlier separation. 
Therefore, a high 
t
Z
d
d
 is used to anticipate instability. The amount of anticipation depends 
on T1 (a nominal value is generally the circuit breaker plus relay operating times). By 
drawing 
t
Z
d
d
- Z  in a phase plane, (2.4) represents a switching line. Using (2.4), one can 
conclude that the control variable U  will become negative when the switching line is 
crossed by the impedance trajectory from right to left. One modification of this method is 
to use the resistance and the rate of change of the resistance instead of impedance, which 
is shown by (2.5). 
t
R
11
d
d
T)RR(U +−=  (2.5) 
This switching line is shown in Figure 2.20. The benefit of this modification is that the 
relay becomes less sensitive to the location of the swing center with respect to the relay 
location [22]. For the conventional method, the switching line is a vertical line in the 
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Rdot/R plane. For a low separation rate (small 
t
R
d
d
), the control variable is similar to the 
conventional method. For a higher separation rate (large 
t
R
d
d
), a larger negative value of 
U  will be achieved and the tripping will be initiated much earlier. This method needs 
extensive simulation studies for various contingencies in order to set the relay 
characteristic properly. 
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Figure 2.20 R-Rdot OOS Characteristic [8] 
Rate of change of swing center voltage: 
Swing center voltage (SCV) is the voltage at the location of the swing center. This 
method is based on tracking the voltage at the swing center. Considering a two-machine 
equivalent system similar to Figure 2.9, Figure 2.21 shows the phasor diagram of voltage 
and current in such a system. 
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Figure 2.21 Voltage Phasor Diagram of a Two-machine System [8] 
SCV becomes zero when the two equivalent systems are 180 degrees separated. When 
a two-source system loses synchronism, the angle difference between the two sources 
increases as a function of time. Assuming the equal voltage source magnitudes (
SR EEE == ), SCV is represented in (2.6) [24]. 
)
2
)t(
cos()
2
)t(
tsin(E2)t(SCV
θθ
ω +=  (2.6) 
The magnitude of SCV is between 0 and 1 pu. Under the normal load condition, the 
value of SCV stays constant. SCV can be also approximated by projection of SV  into the 
current vector (Figure 2.21): 
ϕcosVSCV s≈  (2.7) 
This approximation can be considered valid as the rate of change of SCV provides the 
main information; therefore, the approximation of SCV magnitude has very little impact 
on power swing detection. Moreover, SCV can be approximated using the source voltage 
magnitude: 
)
2
cos(E1SCV 1
θ
≈  (2.8) 
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where 1E is the positive-sequence magnitude of the source voltage, SE . SCV1 is used in 
the presented method in order to detect the power swing. The magnitude of SCV is 
maximum when the angular difference between the two sources is zero. When the angular 
difference is 180 degrees, this voltage magnitude is zero. This fact is used for the purpose 
of power swing detection. The rate of change of SCV, (2.9), is considered as an indicator 
for the swing condition.  
t
1
t
1SCV
d
d
)
2
sin(
2
E
d
d θθ
−≈  (2.9) 
Equation (2.9) provides a relationship between the rate of change of the SCV and the 
two machines system slip frequency, 
td
dθ . When the machines go out-of-step (180 degrees 
separation), this slope is at a minimum (a large negative value). This method usually 
detects the power swing when the angle separation is close to 180 degrees. 
Synchrophasor-based out-of-step relaying: 
This method is based on approximating the system angle separation based on phase 
angle differences between synchrophasors measured at the lines extremities. A two-
machine equivalent system similar to Figure 2.9 is considered. Assume that 
synchrophasors of positive-sequence voltages are measured at the sending and receiving 
ends of the line. The ratio of bus voltages measured by the synchrophasors are presented 
in (2.10), 
θ
θ
∠
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−+
+
∠−+
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E
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 (2.10) 
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where RLST ZZZZ ++=  and 
B
A
E
E
E
K = . 
Assuming that the source impedances are small with respect to line impedance and 
1KE = , the magnitude of the right hand side of (2.10) becomes 1 with angle of θ . This 
result indicates that the angle differences between the two equivalent sources can be 
approximated by the phase angle of the ratio of the synchrophasors measurements at the 
line extremities. This property can be used for out-of-step detection [25]. 
Reference [25] represents a method based on the measurements of a positive-sequence 
voltage-based synchrophasors at two network locations. The slip frequency RS , which is 
the rate of change of the angle between the two measurements of the synchrophasor, and 
the acceleration RA , which is the rate of change of the slip frequency, are derived from 
the measurements. A network separation is initiated if the followings are asserted: 
• If RS  is not zero and is increasing, which means that RA  is positive. 
• Separation will be asserted if: 
OffsetRR ASslopeA +×>  (2.11) 
This is shown in Figure 2.22. This characteristic identifies unstable swings before 
the OOS condition occurs, allowing the system protection scheme to take immediate 
remedial actions. 
• The absolute value of the angle difference between the two synchrophasors becomes 
greater than a threshold. 
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Figure 2.22 Synchrophasor-based Out-of-Step Detection 
Using state-plane trajectories analysis for out-of-step detection: 
Reference [25] suggests the analysis of the state-plane trajectory to check for the out-
of-step condition. This method finds a single-machine equivalent of the system and 
performs the analysis on this equivalent network. The state planes (relative rotor speed 
versus relative voltage angle) during the fault and after the fault are used to distinguish 
stable power swings from unstable power swings. The critical clearing angle and time are 
found based on the maximum potential energy of the system. The critical clearing time is 
used as a criterion in order to predict stable or unstable power swings. The authors claim 
that the proposed method is faster, more efficient, and more accurate than previous 
methods. The disadvantage of this method is using a network equivalent, which may lead 
to inaccuracy. 
Using decision tree technique for out-of-step condition detection: 
References [27]-[28] explain the practice of using a decision tree algorithm for out-of-
step detection. These methods implements training algorithms using the results of 
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transient stability analysis for various contingencies. The achieved strategy can be used to 
recognize stable power swings from unstable power swings in unseen samples. 
Frequency deviation of voltage: 
In [29], a discrete Fourier transform is used in order to calculate the angular velocity of 
the bus voltage and the angular acceleration of the generator rotor angle. A criterion for 
out-of-step detection is developed in this reference by showing these two parameters 
(angular velocity of the bus voltage and the angular acceleration of the generator rotor 
angle) in the same plane. This method just needs voltage measurements without the need 
for current measurements.  
Out-of-step detection using swing impedance trajectory circles: 
Reference [30] proposes a new method based on power swing trajectory for power 
swing detection. This method describes the impedance locus as a circular characteristic 
during the swing and the fault. It is described that, during power swings, the center of the 
impedance trajectory is outside the relay impedance characteristic. However, during a 
fault, this center is located outside the relay impedance characteristic but shifts to a 
location inside the relay impedance characteristic. This identity is used in this reference 
for power swing detection.  
Various methods for power swing detection have been explained. When an unstable 
power swing is detected, the proper OOS tripping and blocking action should be 
performed in order to avoid a system collapse. The location of OOS tripping and blocking 
should be determined in the planning phase. This dissertation covers the issue of 
determining the proper location that OOS blocking functions should be performed. 
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2.3.4 Electromechanical relays 
Electromechanical relays are a mature technology, which has been widely used for 
many years and still applied for many purposes. These devices are usually known for their 
reliable performance and low cost. Most of these devices are based on the presence of 
sufficient torque in order to overcome the restraining spring and rotate the induction disk 
[9]. Both OOS blocking and tripping functions can be performed by electromechanical 
relays. These two types of functions are explained in the following subsections. 
2.3.4.1 Out-of-step blocking relays 
Reference [10] explains that the standard out-of-step blocking relay is an offset mho 
characteristic in conjunction with mho-type tripping unit used for line protection during 
fault. These relays provide blocking of tripping during stable power swings, OOS 
conditions, or blocking from reclosing after OOS tripping at the desired separation 
location. 
A dual-concentric characteristic similar to Figure 2.16-(b) is used for this type of relay. 
The traverse time between inner and outer characteristics is used for out-of-step detection. 
Reference [10] also specifies that it is a common practice to block zone 1 and zone 2 of 
the distance relays by OOS blocking relays. Zone 3 is usually not blocked in order to 
capture if a fault were to occur on that or a nearby line, which may occur during the 
blocking of zone 1 and zone 2. However, [4] specifies that most North American major 
blackouts since 2003 happened due to distance relay mis-operation of zone 3.  
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2.3.4.2 Out-of-step tripping relays 
Reference [10] explains these relays as two modified reactance type units (Figure 
2.23). When a loss of synchronism occurs, the impedance trajectory passes characteristic 
A and characteristic B and will be evaluated by an auxiliary unit in order to ascertain that 
a loss of synchronism has occurred. These relays either trip the local lines or send a 
transfer trip signal to the appropriate separation location. An overcurrent relay is utilized 
to allow operation only if the current is higher or equal to the magnitude of load current. 
P
Q
P ′
Q ′
 
Figure 2.23 Characteristic of Out-of-Step Tripping Relay [10] 
In general, the desired point of separation changes from time to time. Therefore, the 
system operator will have to transfer the trip to another location of the network based on 
system operational condition [10]. 
2.3.5 Static relays 
Static relays are referred to relays in which there is no armature or other moving 
elements. The design response is usually developed by electronic, solid state, magnetic, or 
other components without mechanical motion [9]. Static relays usually provide more 
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flexibility and desired relay operation characteristics. With these relays, two functions of 
out-of-step blocking and tripping can be achieved in one package. Figure 2.24 (a) and (b) 
show two characteristics for these relays. The characteristic presented in Figure 2.24 (a) is 
similar to the offset mho used to describe electromechanical relays. Figure 2.24 (b) shows 
a lens characteristic supervised by a directional mho characteristic; an outer lens 
characteristic is involved in order to differentiate a fault from a power swing. In this 
scheme, tripping is restricted to the shaded area. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 2.24 Static Out-of-Step Relay Characteristic [10]  
The blocking scheme is achieved with the similar logic as electromechanical relays, 
which is based on the traverse time between the outer layer, e.g. mho out-of-step blocking 
(MOB) in Figure 2.24 (a), to the inner layer, e.g. mho tripping (MT) in Figure 2.24 (a). A 
logic circuit for this operation is shown in Figure 2.25. When the impedance locus passes 
MOB or lens out-of-step blocking (LOB), and no output from MT or lens tripping (LT), 
AND1 will produce an input to the A/16 timer. “A” milliseconds later, the timer provides 
an output, which blocks tripping or reclosing. The pick-up time “A” is adjustable between 
2-4 cycles (32 to 64 milliseconds). 
Similarly, the tripping will be initiated if the following sequence of events occurs: 
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1. The swing impedance enters MT of LT more than “A” milliseconds later than MOB 
or LOB. 
2. The swing impedance exits MOB or LOB 1 cycle or later after MT or LT. 
The tripping function initiates the local tripping or sends a transfer trip signal to other 
locations based on the schedule. Please note that the relay logic may be different from 
Figure 2.25 based on the desired relay characteristics [10]. 
 
Figure 2.25 Static Out-of-Step Relays Logic [10] 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter describes issues associated to power swings and out-of-step conditions. 
The impacts of a power swing on the system and various protective relays are studied. 
Various out-of-step detection methods from previous research are presented and analyzed. 
In addition, the OOS protective relaying is explained. This chapter forms the foundation 
for this dissertation by explaining the details of OOS conditions and OOS protection 
function.   
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Chapter 3: Modeling Protection Systems in Time-Domain Simulations 
 
Improving situational awareness is one of the key concerns of utilities, which can be 
achieved by enhancing the representation of protection mechanisms in analysis tools. One 
important analysis tool where this would be required is positive sequence time domain 
analysis for transient stability. The proper representation of protection functions in 
stability software has been a long term goal for utilities. The records from previous 
blackouts confirm the necessity of representing protective devices within transient stability 
studies. The actual representation of protection functions and the identification of which 
protection functions/systems are important to include in a transient stability study will 
greatly enhance the capabilities of the transient stability studies. This dissertation is aimed 
at specifying the important protective relays to be modeled in transient stability studies. 
The impacts of modeling distance relays, OOS relays for generators, under-frequency load 
shedding relays, and under-voltage load shedding relays in transient stability studies are 
analyzed in this chapter. The results of transient stability studies with and without 
modeling protective relays are compared in this chapter. Chapter 4 proposes the proper 
design of OOS blocking schemes. Chapter 5 suggests a method to identify the important 
distance relays to be modeled in a transient stability study. 
3.1 Test case 
The WECC system data representing the 2009 summer peak load case is used to 
perform the analysis. The system includes 16,032 buses, 3,217 generators, 13,994 
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transmission lines, and 6,331 transformers. The overall generation capacity is roughly 238 
GW and the load is roughly 167 GW.  
The data includes nine existing OOS tripping relays. These are defined by a lens and a 
tomato shape. The lens characteristic is the intersection of two circles shown in Figure 3.1. 
The tomato characteristic is the union of the two circles [31]. A summary of these nine 
OOS relays for transmission lines are presented in Table 3.1. Moreover, no distance relays 
are modeled in this dataset. However, several under-voltage load shedding (UVLS) and 
under-frequency load shedding (UFLS) relays are included. In the remaining sections of 
this dissertation, the term “base case” will be used in reference to the results pertaining to 
the original dataset.  
 
Figure 3.1 Relay Characteristic of Type Lens or Tomato 
Table 3.1 Existing OOS Relays in the WECC System 
No. kv Relay zone 1 type 
1 25 Lens 
2 25 Lens 
3 230 Lens 
4 120 Lens 
5 120 Lens 
6 345 Lens 
7 345 Tomato 
8 60 Tomato 
9 120 Lens 
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3.2 Impact of modeling distance relays in transient stability study 
In order to perform this study, distance relays are added on all transmission lines with 
the voltage level higher than or equal to 138 kV. These distance relays are modeled using 
the zlinw model from the Positive Sequence Load Flow (PSLF) library [31]. This model 
considers two zones for each distance relay. Please note that there exist other distance 
relay models in PSLF, which are able to model three zones of distance relays. However, 
implementation of these distance relay models are avoided due to the large-scale test case 
and software limitations. The zone 1 and zone 2 of the modeled distance relays are 
considered to be 0.85 and 1.25 times the transmission line reactance respectively. The 
zone 2 of the distance relays operate with a time delay of 0.25 seconds. Zone 1 initiates 
tripping without any time delay. However, the breaker operation time is modeled to be 
0.03 seconds. While the relay settings for various transmission lines will vary across a 
system, these settings are considered to be similar for all transmission lines in this study 
due to the lack of available data for protection systems across the entire WECC. No 
additional OOS relays are modeled in this case (all originally provided OOS relays are 
included here). In order to have a realistic estimate of system behavior, OOS tripping, 
OOS blocking, and remedial action schemes (RAS) should be modeled within the 
transient stability study; these protection schemes are modeled in the study performed in 
Chapter 4. Please note that the results, which are presented in this chapter, are simply 
showing the importance of modeling distance relays during a transient stability study. 
The outage of the California-Oregon Interface (COI) is studied in this section. The 
COI includes three 500 kV transmission lines transferring about 3800 MW from north to 
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south during this hour and they are very critical tie lines. The result of the transient 
stability study while modeling distance relays are compared with the base case.  
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 show the generators’ relative rotor angles for the base case 
and with modeling distance relays respectively. While modeling distance relays, 9 relays 
operated, which caused the different behavior between Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. 
Modeling distance relays does not impose computational complexity to the transient 
stability study. However, preparing the relays model, data preparation, and data 
maintenance for all high voltage transmission lines are exhaustive tasks. Incorrect models, 
outdated data, or relay mis-representation may result in inaccurate estimation of system 
behavior.  
Moreover, it is not essential to model the distance relays, which are not exposed to the 
power swing. For instance, the distance relays, which connect extremely coherent 
generators, may not be vulnerable to the power swing and do not need to be modeled 
within the transient stability study. Potentially mis-operating distance relays, OOS relays, 
and any other distance relays that influence the results of the transient stability study, 
should be modeled. An efficient approach needs to be developed in order to identify these 
critical distance relays. This dissertation proposes two methods in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5, which identify the potential mis-operating and critical distance relays during the power 
swing. 
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Figure 3.2 Generators’ Relative Rotor Angles without Modeling Distance Relays 
 
Figure 3.3 Generators’ Relative Rotor Angles while Modeling Distance Relays 
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3.3 Impact of modeling under-frequency and under-voltage load shedding relays 
The original test case includes 1881 UFLS relays and 47 UVLS relays. In this section, 
the same contingency as in Section 3.2 is studied. The transient stability studies are 
performed with and without UFLS and UVLS relays. Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show the 
generators’ relative rotor angle with and without modeling UFLS and UVLS relays 
respectively. From these two figures, both stability studies identify that two groups of 
generators will be formed due to the modeled contingency. Note that the two groups of 
generators in both figures are the same, i.e., the two coherent groups of generators in 
Figure 3.4 are identical to the two coherent groups of generators in Figure 3.5. While this 
qualitative result is the same between the two studies, there is more to be understood from 
these figures, which indicate that, indeed, the modeling of UFLS and UVLS is an 
important addition to stability analysis. As can be seen, the speed of the separation of the 
two groups of generators in Figure 3.4 is much faster than the speed of separation of the 
groups in Figure 3.5. By modeling UFLS and UVLS, the drop in frequency for the group 
that has more demand than supply capability will be slower since load shedding occurs. 
Therefore, the separation of the relative rotor angles is smaller in the case with UFLS and 
UVLS activated, which is to be expected. Finally, while the separation scheme and 
distance relays for this contingency are not modeled, the importance of this result remains. 
The speed by which the two groups separate largely impacts system dynamics and the 
ability to form controlled islands that are able to recover from the outage with minimal 
involuntary load shedding, thereby confirming the importance of modeling UFLS and 
UVLS. 
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Figure 3.4 Generators’ Relative Rotor Angles without Modeling UVLS and UFLS 
 
Figure 3.5 Generators’ Relative Rotor Angles while Modeling UVLS and UFLS 
54 
 
This impact of the UFLS and UVLS can be further confirmed with the results in 
Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7. As shown in Figure 3.7, the generators that drop in speed 
recover faster with the modeling of UFLS and UVLS; while there is still a separation of 
the two generator groups, the impact of the generators’ rotor speeds is also important. 
 
Figure 3.6 Generators’ Rotor Speed without Modeling UVLS and UFLS 
 
Figure 3.7 Generators’ Rotor Speed while Modeling UVLS and UFLS 
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Similarly, Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 show the bus frequency with and without 
modeling UVLS and UFLS at the locations that UFLS relays triggered. Figures 3.4-3.8 
prove the importance of modeling UVLS and UFLS relays during transient stability study. 
 
Figure 3.8 Bus Frequency without Modeling UVLS and UFLS 
 
Figure 3.9 Bus Frequency while Modeling UVLS and UFLS 
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3.4 Impact of modeling OOS relays for generators 
An out-of-step condition causes high currents and added pressure in the generator 
windings; out-of-step conditions also cause high levels of transient shaft torque. Pole 
slipping events can also result in abnormally high stator core end iron fluxes that can lead 
to overheating and shorting at the ends of the stator core. The step-up transformer will also 
experience very high transient winding currents. A proper OOS protection scheme should 
be designed for generators in order to avoid severe damages to the generators and the step-
up transformers. This section studies the importance of modeling generators’ OOS relays 
during dynamic studies. 
The WECC data set, which is discussed in Section 3.1, is used for this study. 
However, the contingency under study is different from Section 3.2 and Section 3.3. First, 
a three-phase fault at bus Navajo 500 kV is modeled. This fault is cleared after four cycles 
(0.067 seconds) by opening two transmission lines: Navajo-Crystal 500 kV and Navajo-
Moenkopi 500 kV. Navajo-Crystal 500 kV transfers 978 MW from Navajo to Crystal in 
the pre-contingency operational state. Similarly, Navajo-Moenkopi 500 kV transfers 824 
MW from Navajo to Moenkopi in the pre-contingency operational state.  
Figure 3.10 shows the generators’ relative rotor angles. As a result of this contingency, 
Navajo generators lose synchronism with the other generators. Transient stability studies 
are performed with and without modeling OOS relays for Navajo generators. These OOS 
relays are designed similar to the OOS relay settings, which is discussed in Section 
2.3.2.1. While modeling OOS relays for Navajo generators, these generators would be 
disconnected when they slip a pole; as a result, the impacts of their loss of synchronism 
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will not be reflected on the other results of transient stability studies. Without modeling 
OOS protective relays for these generators, the impacts of their loss of synchronism would 
be shown in the other results of transient stability studies and cause inappropriate 
estimation of system behavior. 
 
Figure 3.10 Generators’ Relative Rotor Angles 
In the study performed in this section, if the OOS protective relays are not modeled on 
Navajo generators, frequency oscillates and deviates more than the set points of 38 UFLS 
relays. These UFLS relays reduce the load at these locations. While modeling OOS relays 
for Navajo generators, frequency does not deviate from the set points of any of these 
UFLS relays. Figures 3.11-3.14 show the bus voltage magnitude and bus frequency at 
these 38 locations with and without modeling OOS relays for Navajo generators. Without 
modeling OOS relays for the Navajo generators, voltage and frequency show oscillatory 
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behavior. These oscillations are results of pole slipping of Navajo generators as these 
generators are not disconnected in this case. In order to have a realistic estimate of system 
behavior, it is essential to model OOS relays for the involved generators. 
 
Figure 3.11 Bus Voltage Magnitudes without Modeling OOS Relays for Navajo 
Generators 
 
Figure 3.12 Bus Voltage Magnitudes while Modeling OOS Relays for Navajo 
Generators 
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Figure 3.13 Bus Frequency without Modeling OOS Relays for Navajo Generators 
 
Figure 3.14 Bus Frequency while Modeling OOS Relays for Navajo Generators 
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3.5 Summary 
This chapter shows the importance of modeling distance relays, OOS generation 
relays, UVLS, and UFLS relays within a transient stability study in order to achieve a 
realistic estimate of system behavior. Modeling OOS relays for transmission lines is 
explored in Chapter 4, where an analytical method is presented that identifies the proper 
locations for OOS blocking functions. Modeling all of the distance relays, data 
preparation, and data maintenance are exhaustive tasks. Therefore, this dissertation 
proposes a methodology that can successfully identify critical distance relays to be 
modeled in transient stability studies.   
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Chapter 4: Identifying Mis-operating Relays for Unstable Power Swings 
 
Data from many blackouts in North America confirm that distance relay mis-operation 
is one key factor that may initiate a series of outages, which can cause a blackout. A 
power swing, triggered by initiating events, can cause protection system mis-operation. 
During an unstable power swing, the voltage magnitude at the electrical center will be 
depressed, resulting in protective relays detecting what appears to be a fault and, thus, the 
protective relays will trip additional transmission lines [4]. Mis-operation of relays may 
lead to reduction of transfer capability, unwanted islanding, and/or load shedding and 
excessive generation. The load-generation unbalance can cause under-frequency relays to 
operate in each unintentional island leading to system collapse. In order to avoid cascading 
events, the distance relays, which are located at the electrical center, should be blocked 
from tripping. 
This dissertation proposes a methodology, minimum voltage evaluation method, that 
contributes to the challenge to detect mis-operating relays during unstable power swings 
and identifies essential locations for OOS blocking functions. The proposed minimum 
voltage evaluation method extends the empirical based approach of [8] with an analytical 
approach to determine the worst voltage dip along transmission lines. This approach is not 
only effective but it is straightforward, easy to implement, and computationally fast 
making it suitable for large-scale power systems. Furthermore, the simulation results 
demonstrate that the proposed approach is able to detect all transmission lines along the 
electrical center. Prior methods, such as the projected relay trajectory method in [32], do 
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not detect all potential mis-operating relays, which can lead to further relay mis-operation 
and, thus, a cascading outage.  
In the following sections of this chapter, the impedance observed by distance relays at 
relay location is studied first. Then, an overview of the previous methods for identifying 
electrical center is shown. The electrical center detection method proposed by [32] is 
described in detail. The proposed method of this research is explained in Section 4.3.  
4.1 Swing impedance locus seen by distance relay 
A distance relay may recognize a power swing as a fault if the impedance observed by 
the relay enters the relay impedance characteristic. The impedance measured by the relay 
during an OOS condition is presented below. Figure 4.1 shows the one-line diagram of a 
two-generator equivalent system. 
The location of the relay, whose behavior is studied here, is shown in Figure 4.1. Each 
generator may represent a generator or a group of generators, which remain in 
synchronism with respect to each other. 
 
Figure 4.1 One-line Diagram of the System 
The impedance observed by the relay is calculated as follows, 
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Considering BE  as the reference and that AE advances in phase ahead of BE  by the 
angle θ  and magnitude of BnE , 
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Reference [33] presents a figure (Figure 13 in chapter X of [33]) that shows a general 
impedance chart for various values of n  and θ . For 1=n , 
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and, thus, 
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Point P in Figure 4.2 shows the value of Z  for a particular θ  and for 1n = . Moreover, 
various components of Z  (
2
ZZZ BLA ++ ,
2
ZZZ
)
2
cotj( BLA
++
−
θ
, and AZ− ) are 
shown in Figure 4.2. Using the vector addition rule for these components, the relay 
impedance values ( Z ) lies on the dashed line through OP for any value of θ . The 
impedance observed by the relay (line OP in this case) during an OOS condition is 
referred to as loss of synchronism characteristic or power swing locus. Line OP is the 
perpendicular bisector of the line connecting points A and B. 
During power swing, the generators slip poles, i.e., 180=θ . Calculating (4.6) for 
180=θ , 
64 
 
A
BLA Z
2
ZZZ
Z −
++
= .
 (4.7) 
 
Figure 4.2 Relay Impedance Trajectory [15] 
Using (4.7) and the vector addition rule in Figure 4.2, the relay observes the 
impedance at point O for 180=θ . Therefore, loss of synchronism characteristic intersects 
impedance characteristic in OOS condition, i.e., 180=θ . At this point the relay observes 
conditions identical to a three-phase fault. This point is electrically approximately midway 
between the ends of the line and indicates the “electrical center” of the system. At the 
point where line AB intersects the relay impedance, generator A has advanced generator B 
by 180 degrees [10]. In other words, at the electrical center, the two generators are 180 
degrees apart. When a generator relative rotor angle reaches 180 degrees, the machine is 
said to have lost synchronism, reached an OOS condition, or have slipped a pole.  
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Figure 4.3 shows the locations of P for various values of θ . This location can be found 
by drawing straight lines from either A or B at an angle of ( 290 θ− ) to AB and 
determines its intersection with the perpendicular bisector of line AB. 
Figure 4.4 shows loss of synchronous characteristic for various values of n. When the 
transmission line is long (200-300 miles), the impedance locus is similar to 1n >  or 
1n <  [10]. 
 
Figure 4.3 Loss of Synchronism Characteristic 
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Figure 4.4 Loss of Synchronism Characteristic for Various Values of n 
As shown in this figure, the electrical center may not be located electrically midway of 
a line impedance for 1n ≠ . An interesting observation is the dashed circle. This circle 
intersects the loss of synchronism characteristic for various value of n for the same value 
of θ . In other words, P1, P2, and P3 occur at the same value of angle difference but for 
different values of n. Another interesting fact is that the ratios of lengths of lines drawn 
from A and B to any of these points is equal to n. For instance, AP1/BP1=n in Figure 4.4 
[15]. 
Figure 4.5 shows the relay characteristic with the loss of synchronism characteristic 
displayed in the same R-X plot. It can be seen that the loss of synchronism characteristic 
enters the relay characteristic when there is an increase in the value of θ . When generator 
A advances generator B by 2θ , the loss of synchronism characteristic enters the zone 2 
characteristic of the distance relay. Similarly, for the angle difference of 3θ , the 
synchronism characteristic enters the first zone of the relay. Furthermore, if the angle 
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difference increases to 180, the relay will observe a zero magnitude voltage at the 
electrical center. As mentioned previously, at the electrical center, conditions identical to a 
three-phase short circuit will be observed by the relay and swing impedance locus 
intersects the line impedance. For this unstable case, the relay will trip unless it is blocked 
from tripping by the use of an OOS blocking scheme. In order to obtain a proper OOS 
scheme, the separation should take place considering load and generation balance in each 
island and the stability of each island. Thus, it is usually required to block the lines, which 
observe the electrical center, from tripping. This requires the operator to perform sufficient 
studies and recognize the electrical centers properly. 
 
Figure 4.5 Relay Mho and Loss of Synchronism Characteristic 
In the following section of this chapter, various different electrical center detection 
methods are reviewed. The method presented in Section 4.2.3 is based on the intersection 
of swing impedance locus with line impedance. This method is presented in reference 
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[32]. This dissertation proposes the method explained in Section 4.3, which is based on 
voltage properties of the electrical center. 
4.2 An overview of electrical center detection methods 
4.2.1 Traditional methods 
In the literature, some approaches have been proposed to determine whether a loss of 
synchronism characteristic traverses a specific line. Most of these methods are based on 
reduction of the complex power system to a two-source equivalent system (Thévenin 
equivalent model similar to Figure 4.1). IEEE PSRC WG D6 [11] presents two different 
processes for reducing a complex power system to a two-source equivalent system 
connected by a transmission line parallel to the line of interest. One of these methods 
utilizes the output of an equivalent network from a commercial short circuit program 
while the other method uses three-phase short circuit currents from a short circuit 
program. These two models are explained here. 
4.2.1.1 Finding equivalent models from commercial short circuit program 
This method uses the output of a commercially available short circuit program in order 
to find the equivalent models. The under-study line is deleted from the system and an 
equivalent two-part network as seen from the two ends of the line of interest is calculated 
using the commercial short circuit program. This equivalent model is shown in Figure 4.6; 
( SZ , RZ , and TRZ ) are reported by the short circuit program. At this stage, the 
transmission line of interest is inserted back to the model and the total impedance ( TZ ) is 
calculated: 
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TZ  is used to study whether the line in along the system wide electrical center; this 
analysis is similar to the analysis of Section 4.1. It is considered that the swing locus 
bisects TZ , assuming the equal source voltage magnitude ( RS EE = ). 
 
Figure 4.6 Two-Source System Equivalent [11] 
4.2.1.2 Using three-phase short circuit currents from a short circuit program for 
finding equivalent model 
The second method is based on the knowledge of the total three-phase fault current at 
the two ends of the under-study transmission line as well as the fault current flow on this 
line. Considering the following distribution factors,  
S3
RS3
S
I
I
K
−
−
=
Φ
Φ  (4.9) 
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Φ  (4.10) 
where RS3I −Φ and SR3I −Φ  are fault currents over the line for a three-phase fault at bus S 
and R in per unit respectively. S3I −Φ  and R3I −Φ  are the total fault currents for a three-
phase fault at bus S and bus R in per unit respectively. 
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Using (4.11)-(4.13), the wye equivalent network can be calculated; this network 
equivalent is shown in Figure 4.7. 
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)K1(XZW S1STh1 −−= −  (4.13) 
SThZ − , which is the positive-sequence driving point impedance for a fault at bus S, is 
shown in (4.14), 
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Figure 4.7 Wye System Equivalent with Line Reintroduced between Buses S and R 
[11] 
By converting this wye model to a delta equivalent, the equivalent model is then 
similar to Figure 4.6. The reduction of a complex power system to a two-machine system 
can be considered as the traditional approach to determine the electrical center. Reference 
[8] specifies that these methods are applied to a northwest portion of the Eastern 
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Interconnection of the United States. The system includes a ring of 345 kV transmission 
lines around an underlying 115 kV system. The equivalent methods recognize that the 
swing center will pass through at least one of these 345 kV lines and most of 115 kV lines.  
However, if any machine loses synchronism with their own group, this approach (two-
machine equivalent model) cannot be used and a network-analyzer study is required [15]. 
The two-machine equivalent approach requires a-priori knowledge of the electrical center 
location since the two asynchronous groups of generators cannot be modeled as a single 
equivalent machine, i.e., the rotor oscillations are not in phase. In addition, [8] refers to 
[32] with regards to this two-machine equivalent method, “When more than a line or two 
are to be analyzed, it is virtually impossible to use the method,” [34]. It is explained that 
these methods are useful for identifying the electrical center between independent systems 
connected by limited number of tie lines. 
4.2.2 Observing relay impedance characteristic method 
Reference [10] expresses that the traditional method is not applicable for network type 
systems. It is explained that, it is necessary to perform a transient study on all possible 
combination of operating conditions; using a present-day advanced transient study 
program, the impedance locus at any or all transmission lines can be studied during the 
power swing. The intersection of this impedance locus and the line impedance can be 
studied in order to specify whether the line is along the electrical center. However, this 
approach is not applicable for large-scale test cases. An auxiliary method should be 
applied to find the intersection of the impedance locus and line impedance. One auxiliary 
method is explained in Section 4.2.3 below.  
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4.2.3 Projected relay trajectory method  
Reference [32] provides a new approach, which is a more practical approach for the 
method in [10]. The technique suggested in [32] is innovative and advantageous in 
locating the electrical center for an unstable power swing. In this method, two sequential 
points on the relay impedance trajectory (corresponding to two sequential time intervals of 
transient studies) are projected to a perpendicular line of the transmission line impedance. 
If these projected values are of opposite algebraic signs, it is concluded that the relay 
impedance trajectory has intersected the line impedance characteristic between these two 
time intervals; therefore, the transmission line under study lies along the electrical center. 
Throughout the rest of this dissertation, the term “projected relay trajectory method” will 
refer to the electrical center detection algorithm in [32]. 
Reference [32] explains that the following two criteria are two features of an electrical 
center: 
• The ratio of the magnitude of relay impedance to the magnitude of line impedance is 
less than 1. This is referred to as the magnitude criterion. 
• At an electrical center, the relay impedance angle ( Rθ ) is equal to the transmission 
line impedance angle ( Lθ ). This criterion is referred to as the angle criterion. As the 
transient stability study just simulates the snapshot of the system, achieving LR θθ =  
is not likely. One can use the sign changes in ( LR θθ − ) between two consecutive 
snapshots to check for this criterion.  
However, the authors of [32] have explained that using these two criteria may not be 
sufficient. They indicate that the proper method is to find the exact point of intersection of 
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the loss of synchronism characteristic and transmission line impedance. This point should 
be in the first quadrant to represent an electrical center. For this purpose, trajectory 
sensitivity of the rotor angles to the branch impedance is implemented. Projected relay 
trajectory algorithm to locate the electrical center on a transmission line is as follows. 
Let )X,(RZ ttt  and )X,(RZ 1t-1t-1t-  represent the relay impedance at instants t  and 1t −  
respectively. )X,(RZ LLL  represents the transmission line impedance. 
1. In order to check if the electrical center is located on the transmission line between 
instants t and 1t −  (the loss of synchronism characteristic intersects transmission 
line impedance ( LZ )), tZ  and 1t-Z  are projected on to the axis perpendicular to the 
transmission line impedance. This is shown in Figure 4.8. Assume α  and β  are the 
projected points, 
tLtL XRRX ×+×−=α  (4.15) 
1tL1tL XRRX −− ×+×−=β . (4.16) 
1−tZ
tZ
α
β
LZ
 
Figure 4.8 Projection of Swing Impedance on the Axis Perpendicular to the 
Transmission Line Impedance 
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2. If α  and β  have opposite signs, then tZ  and 1tZ −  are located on the opposite side of 
the transmission line impedance, which indicates that the swing impedance locus 
intersects the line impedance characteristic between these two time steps. The 
intersection of the transmission line impedance and the loss of synchronism 
characteristic indicates the electrical center impedance, which is referred to as 
)X,R( EE .  
Let 
1tt
1tt
R
RR
XX
m
−
−
−
−
= , 
L
L
L
R
X
m = , and tRt RmXc ×−= . 
Then, 
RL
E
mm
c
R
−
=  (4.17) 
ELE RmX ×=  (4.18) 
If either α  or β  is zero, then the corresponding impedance ( tZ  or 1tZ − ) actually 
lies on the transmission line impedance. Therefore, the electrical center impedance is 
either tZ  or 1tZ − .  
3. If LE RR0 ≤≤  and LE XX0 ≤≤ , then the electrical center exists on the transmission 
line of interest )X,R( EE . 
This method identifies the electrical center properly. However, there are other 
circumstances during the power swing when the relays may mis-operate; for instance, the 
swing impedance locus may enter zones of the relay characteristic and can cause mis-
operation. This method is not able to recognize this situation as the swing impedance is 
not intersecting the line impedance characteristic. In addition, this method considers the 
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transition of swing impedance between the two time steps as a line. However, this 
behavior may not be necessarily linear. This assumption impacts the accuracy of the 
result. This dissertation proposed an electrical center detection method, which does not 
suffer from such shortcomings. The projected relay trajectory method [32] is implemented 
and compared with the method proposed in this dissertation. Section 4.5 provides 
examples where the projected relay trajectory method fails. 
4.2.4 Identification of coherent generators 
Reference [35] presents a method to find the coherent groups of generators during a 
fault and at the post-fault stage. The coherent group of generators is found by comparing 
rotor angles of pairs of generators during the fault and at early stage of post-fault period. 
The unstable equilibrium point is studied to determine the coherency of the generators at 
an early post-fault stage. In order to make sure that each group stays coherent in the later 
stages, the admittance distances between the groups of generators are checked. The 
coherent groups of generators can also provide some information for the power swing 
center. The transmission lines connecting two different groups are potentially along the 
electrical center.  
4.2.5 Voltage dip screening method 
In [8], the system protection and control subcommittee of NERC suggests a voltage 
dip screening method in order to identify power swings and locate the system electrical 
center of a power swing. The voltage dip screening method in [8] can be used in transient 
planning studies. Such planning studies evaluate the power system operating condition, 
including voltages, for many contingencies in order to study the compliance of the system 
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with various standards. The approach from [8] examines voltage drops during oscillations 
of the coherent groups of generators, i.e., inter-area oscillations. The transmission lines 
between these coherent groups of generators (at the electrical center) experience a 
condition similar to a three-phase short circuit, i.e., the line-to-line voltages become zero 
[33] and [36]. Using this attribute, the voltage dip screening method in [8] suggests that 
monitoring the voltage magnitude throughout the system (at buses) can be considered as a 
flag for a power swing and can detect the electrical center. Empirical evidence shows that 
voltage magnitudes at buses, particularly at those buses connected to lines along the 
electrical center, drop to at least the range of 0.5 and 0.6 pu [8]. Moreover, an analysis is 
performed in [8] in order to show the correlation between the voltage dip and presence of 
the relay impedance trajectory in distance relay zones. This reference indicates that 
additional studies need to be conducted in order to establish voltage dip thresholds. 
Although the suggested method in [8] is based on empirical results and is intuitive, it 
sheds light on the application of voltage evaluation techniques for power swing conditions 
and system electrical center detection.  
Reference [37] explains the voltage dip as the main problem of unstable power swings. 
It is explained that for voltage dips below 0.8 pu, some large industrial drives and motors 
may trip and cause unwanted situations. This reference has tried to find voltage dips by 
calculating the maximum potential energy.  
4.3 Minimum voltage evaluation method for electrical center detection  
This dissertation proposes a method that provides a screening tool for OOS and 
electrical center detection during transient stability planning studies, which can be 
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considered an extension of the voltage dip screening method [8] (Section 4.2.5). While the 
method of [8] relies on a voltage drop only at buses, the proposed analytical approach can 
evaluate voltage magnitudes anywhere along all transmission assets. The proposed 
extension is critical since a voltage dip screening approach relying only on bus voltage 
magnitudes can be highly inaccurate since the electrical center can occur at a bus or along 
a transmission line. Terminal buses of the transmission lines along the electrical center 
may not experience extreme voltage drops. Note that [8] examines only stable power 
swings while the proposed approach also applies to unstable power swings. 
The proposed method evaluates the voltage magnitude throughout the system using the 
outputs of the transient stability planning study. The voltage magnitude along each 
transmission line can be calculated based on the network solution, i.e., the value of bus 
voltages and transmission lines flows, at each time interval of the transient stability study. 
Therefore, the proposed model does not require any modification to existing transient 
stability study practices.  
If the magnitude of the voltage along transmission lines (or at the terminal buses) 
reduces significantly, while no fault is present on the transmission line, it can be 
concluded that the system is experiencing an unstable power swing. In addition, the 
distance relays of the transmission lines with the depressed voltage are prone to operate. 
Therefore, these relays should be equipped with OOS blocking functions. 
This method includes the following assumptions: 1) the shunt admittance of lines are 
considered to be negligible. Therefore, the current through the line is assumed to be same 
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as the current at the ends of the line. 2) It is assumed that the line impedance is uniform 
throughout the length of the line.  
First, a transient stability study for the critical contingency needs to be performed. 
Using bus voltages and transmission lines flows, which are known for each time interval 
from the results of the transient stability study, the value of voltage along each 
transmission line can be evaluated using (4.19). Note that a  represents the fraction of the 
length of the transmission line under study. This is shown in Figure 4.9. 
( ) ( )y1x1y1y1x1x1
11a
aRIaXIVjaXIaRIV
I)jXR(aVV
−−++−=
+×−=
 (4.19) 
where x1V , y1V , x1I , and y1I  are real part of 1V , imaginary part of 1V , real part of 1I , 
and imaginary part of 1I  respectively. Moreover, R  and X  are resistance and reactance 
of the transmission line respectively. Therefore, the magnitude of aV  is as (4.20). 
( ) ( )2y1x1y12y1x1x1a aRIaXIVaXIaRIVV −−++−=  (4.20) 
2V1V 1I jXR+
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Figure 4.9 Evaluation of Voltage throughout the Transmission Lines 
From the result of transient stability study, all of the variables on the right hand side of 
(4.20) (except a ) at each time step are known. Therefore, the voltage magnitude through 
the line (for various values of a ) can be calculated at each snapshot of time under study. 
Furthermore, the minimum voltage magnitude, which shows the worst voltage dip, 
through a transmission line can be calculated at each time interval using the minimization 
problem presented in (4.21). Evaluating this minimum voltage, it is possible to determine 
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whether the protective relays of line would mis-operate during an unstable power swing. It 
is expected that the voltage magnitude reduces to zero at a point through the lines, which 
are located along the electrical center.  
( ) ( )2y1x1y12y1x1x1a aRIaXIVaXIaRIVVMinimize −−++−=  
1a0:toSubject ≤≤  (4.21) 
The minimization problem is a single variable optimization problem, i.e., a  is the 
only unknown in this problem. There are three types of points that this non-liner problem 
can have a local minimum solution: 1) Points where 0
d
d
a
aV
=  for 1a0 ≤≤ . 2) End points, 
i.e., a=0, or a=1. 3) Points where 
a
aV
d
d
 does not exists. The smallest value of aV  among 
the local minimums is considered as the global minimum solution for minimization 
problem represented in (4.21). 
This method calculates the minimum voltage through each transmission line and at 
each time step of the transient stability study. This minimum voltage then will be 
evaluated. If the minimum voltage along a transmission line (in the absence of a fault) is 
zero, the contingency would lead to an OOS condition and the associated line is along the 
electrical center. However, the transient stability study monitors the system behavior in 
discrete time intervals. The voltage magnitude through the line may traverse to zero in 
between two discrete time intervals. In such cases, it is insufficient to search for a voltage 
magnitude of zero. Since power swings traverse slowly, a small threshold can be 
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considered for this technique. Therefore, if (4.22) holds, the contingency would lead to an 
unstable power swing and the transmission line is located along the electrical center.  
ε≤minaV  (4.22) 
where mina
V  is the minimum voltage magnitude through the transmission line, which 
occurs at  amin fraction of the length of the line and ε  represents the established 
threshold. 
Note that the minimization problem, (4.21), and the evaluation of (4.22) should be 
performed for all time intervals of the transient stability study in order to detect all of the 
mis-operating relays. 
4.4 Test case and contingency description 
The WECC system data, which is explained in Section 3.1 and represents the 2009 
summer peak load case, is used to perform the analysis. The California-Oregon Interface 
(COI) are very critical tie lines, which are transferring about 3800 MW from north to 
south during this hour.  
First, an outage on two of the three COI ties is studied, which causes a stable power 
swing. The minimum voltage during this stable power swing is evaluated and the 
application of the minimum voltage evaluation method is explained in Section 4.5.1. 
Second, a fault on bus MALIN, located in the Northwest area, is modeled. It is considered 
that this fault leads to the outage of all three COI tie lines, which results in an unstable 
power swing; see Sections 4.5.2-4.5.4 for a discussion of this case. Both these 
contingencies fall under category D of the NERC standard [38]. 
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In the dataset provided, no distance relays are modeled. As it is mentioned in Chapter 
3, the term “base case” will be used in reference to the results pertaining to the original 
dataset. Transient stability analysis is first performed on the base case dataset considering 
the described contingencies (double and triple outages of the COI). 
Additional studies are conducted where the triple line outage of the COI is studied with 
the modeling of distance relays for all lines at or above 100 kV. These distance relays are 
modeled using a model from the PSLF library [31]. This model, zlinw, just considers two 
zones for each distance relay. Please note that this specific distance relay model is chosen 
due to the large-scale test case and software limitation. The settings of these relays are 
similar to Section 3.2. The zone 1 and zone 2 of the modeled distance relays are 
considered to be 0.85 and 1.25 times the transmission line reactance respectively. Zone 1 
initiates tripping without any time delay. A time delay of 0.25 seconds is considered for 
zone 2. The breaker operation time is modeled to be 0.03 seconds. While the relay settings 
for various distance relays are different across a system, these settings are considered to be 
alike for all transmission lines because of the lack of available data for protection systems 
across the entire WECC.  
A controlled islanding scheme is tested using the designed OOS protection. The OOS 
tripping is based on the well-known northeast/southeast (NE/SE) separation scheme for 
the WECC [39]-[41]. This separation would be initiated after receiving a transfer trip 
signal from Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) 
[42]. An OOS blocking scheme is performed based on the minimum voltage evaluation 
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method. In order to compare the proposed method with previous research, the OOS 
blocking function, based on the projected relay trajectory method [32], is also tested.  
In order to test both the minimum voltage evaluation and the method in [32], a series 
of steps are carried out to replicate existing industry practices. Existing practices for 
conducting transient stability studies do not contain the modeling of protection systems 
particularly distance relays. Therefore, transient stability studies are conducted using the 
base case dataset, which does not include the distance relays. The transient stability results 
are used by these two approaches, the minimum voltage evaluation method and the 
method from [32], to determine appropriate OOS blocking schemes; Sections 4.5.3-4.5.4 
present these results. Next, the protection systems and associated OOS blocking schemes 
are then modeled in transient stability analysis to determine if there are any relay mis-
operations using these two approaches, the minimum voltage evaluation method and the 
projected relay trajectory method [32]. Note that the corresponding RAS of the described 
contingency (outage of COI interties) are modeled in all simulations, which includes the 
tripping of generators in the northwest, brake insertion at Chief Joseph, generator and 
pump load tripping in northern California, series capacitor bypassing in northern 
California, shunt reactor or capacitor insertion where needed, and the NE\SE Separation 
Scheme [43]. The NE\SE Separation Scheme initiates after the trip signal is received at 
Four Corners. In addition, all other RAS schemes in [43], which may be initiated as a 
result of relay mis-operation based on the system conditions, are modeled. More details 
are provided in Section 4.5.3. 
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4.5 Numerical results and analysis 
All transient stability studies are performed using PSLF. The minimum voltage 
evaluation method and the projected relay trajectory method [32] are programmed using 
MATLAB to locate the potential mis-operating relays. First, the application of the 
proposed method for OOS detection is described in Section 4.5.1. Then, the impacts of the 
simultaneous outage of three COI ties are studied using the base case data in Section 4.5.2. 
A transient stability study for the triple line outage of the COI is performed while 
modeling distance relays and OOS protection schemes in Sections 4.5.3-4.5.4. In Section 
4.5.3, the OOS blocking is implemented based on the projected relay trajectory method 
[32]. The proposed minimum voltage evaluation method is tested in Section 4.5.4. 
4.5.1 Out-of-step detection  
The minimum voltage evaluation method determines whether a specific contingency 
would cause an unstable power swing. After conducting a transient stability study, the 
minimum voltage of each transmission line can be calculated using the proposed method. 
This minimum voltage magnitude can be used as an indicator of stability of the power 
swing. In this section, the outage of two COI ties is studied. This contingency causes a 
stable power swing, i.e., all generators swing together. The proposed method estimates the 
minimum voltage magnitude through all transmission lines in the system to be 0.43 pu. 
Performing a similar study for an unstable power swing, i.e., initiated by triple outages of 
the COI tie lines, the minimum voltage magnitude is observed to be 0 pu. Therefore, a 
voltage magnitude of 0 (or near to 0) in the power system (in the absence of a fault) 
indicates an unstable power swing. 
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4.5.2 System behavior during COI tie lines contingency 
A transient stability study for the base case dataset considering the simultaneous 
outage of all three COI ties has been performed. The generators’ relative rotor angles are 
shown in Figure 4.10. As observed in Figure 4.10, the generators are split into two 
separate groups. Some of the generators lose synchronism within their own group and 
continue to slip poles. For this operating condition and in response to the described 
contingency, the generators located in the northern part of the system accelerate in 
comparison to the generators located in the southern part of the system. Figure 4.11 shows 
the accelerating and decelerating areas within the WECC system for this power swing. 
 
Figure 4.10 Generators Relative Rotor Angles for the Base Case. 
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Figure 4.11 Acceleration and Deceleration Areas for the WECC System [39] 
4.5.3 Out-of-step blocking using the projected relay trajectory method [32] 
In this section, the simultaneous outage of all three COI ties, which results in an OOS 
condition, is studied. An OOS protection scheme is designed and modeled for the WECC 
system. The OOS blocking scheme is located on the transmission lines along the electrical 
center found by the projected relay trajectory method [32]. A separation scheme based on 
the slow coherency controlled islanding scheme is implemented [39]-[41]. This separation 
scheme is compatible with the NE/SE separation and splits the system into two islands. 
This split is implemented by tripping 15 transmission lines of the desired cutset during the 
OOS condition, which is initiated by the outage on the COI tie lines. In order to observe 
the impact of relay mis-operation, a delayed separation scheme is implemented. The time 
sequence of the actions is shown in Figure 4.12. Moreover, as mentioned in Section 4.4, 
the distance relays for all transmission lines at or above 100 kV are modeled. 
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Figure 4.12 Time Sequence of the Contingency Under Study 
When designing the OOS blocking functions based on the projected relay trajectory 
method [32], seven additional distance relays observe the relay impedance trajectory in 
their characteristic and mis-operate. These mis-operating relays protect three 345 kV, two 
230 kV, and two 115 kV transmission lines. Mis-operation of one of the relays (namely 
Montrose-Hesperus 345 kV line) initiates a RAS action when the Nucla generators operate 
above 60 MW [43]: the Montrose-Nucla 115 kV line is automatically transfer tripped. 
This RAS action (TOT2A in [43]) is also modeled in this study. Please note that none of 
the other RAS actions, which are presented in [43], initiate during the performed study. 
The relay impedance trajectory of one of the mis-operating relays located on a 345 kV 
line is shown in Figure 4.13. Zone 2 of this distance relay initiates tripping during this 
unstable power swing. The relay impedance trajectory enters and stays in the zone 2 
characteristic of this relay for 0.316 s. This relay needs to be blocked from tripping. 
Blocking can be achieved using a dual blinder scheme. Unlike the projected relay 
trajectory method [32], the minimum voltage evaluation method is able to successfully 
detect this line as a necessary location to install OOS blocking function, such as a dual 
blinder scheme. All of the per unit (pu) values, which are specified in the figures, are 
calculated using the corresponding system base values. 
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Figure 4.13 Relay Impedance Trajectory for a Mis-operating Relay on a 345 kV 
Transmission Line 
The relay trajectory in Figure 4.13 is recorded while other distance relays have mis-
operated and the network topology has been updated. As mentioned before, no distance 
relay is included while collecting the data input of the proposed method and the method of 
[32]. Therefore, the effects of mis-operation of relays are not captured in the initial study. 
In order to study the deficiency of the projected relay trajectory method [32], the relay 
trajectory should be studied without modeling the mis-operation of the other relays. Such 
a relay trajectory for the relay on the same 345 kV transmission line is shown in Figure 
4.14. While the relay impedance trajectory passed very close to the line impedance, it does 
not intersect the line impedance; therefore, the projected relay trajectory method [32] is 
not able to predict mis-operation of this distance relay. It can be concluded that simply 
blocking the relay on the lines where their relay impedance trajectory intersects the line 
impedance is not sufficient; the protective relays on the other transmission lines, which 
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connect two oscillating groups of generators, may mis-operate. A more generic approach 
needs to be implemented in order to recognize all of the mis-operating relays. These mis-
operating relays need to be equipped with OOS blocking functions to prevent blackouts. 
Similarly, the relay impedance trajectories of another mis-operating relay, which is 
located on a 115 kV line, are shown in Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16. Figure 4.15 shows 
this relay impedance locus while including the modeling of distance relays and the OOS 
blocking function using method of [32], which results in other relays mis-operating as 
well. While in this figure the relay impedance trajectory intersects the line impedance, this 
transmission line is not detected by the method in [32] for a potential relay mis-operation.  
 
Figure 4.14 Relay Impedance Trajectory for a Mis-operating Relay on a 345 kV 
Transmission Line without Modeling any Distance Relay 
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Figure 4.15 Relay Impedance Trajectory for a Mis-operating Relay on a 115 kV 
Transmission Line 
Figure 4.16 shows the impedance trajectory of the same relay without considering the 
effects of other relay mis-operations. As seen in Figure 4.16, the relay impedance 
trajectory does not intersect the line impedance, which is why the projected relay 
trajectory method [32] is not able to predict the mis-operation of this line. Therefore, the 
projected relay trajectory method [32] is sensitive to the network topology and is 
inaccurate without modeling protection systems when conducting the initial transient 
stability study. To this date, due to the complexity of integrating, maintaining, and 
updating protection system data with the transient stability data, these two different sets of 
data are usually handled separately. Therefore, a method with a high level of sensitivity to 
the protection system operation is less desirable. In addition, based on these results, it can 
be concluded that failing to detect relay mis-operation may cause additional relays to mis-
operate. 
90 
 
 
Figure 4.16 Relay Impedance Trajectory for a Mis-operating Relay on a 115 kV 
Transmission Line without Modeling any Distance Relay 
As mentioned earlier in this section, seven additional distance relays mis-operate if the 
OOS blocking scheme is designed based on the projected relay trajectory method [32]. 
While modeling TOT2A RAS and as a result of mis-operation of these seven relays, four 
additional uncontrolled islands are formed: a 38-bus island, an 11-bus island, a 9-bus 
island, and one individually isolated bus. The 38-bus uncontrolled island is formed due to 
the mis-operation of 4 distance relays along with tripping of 3 other transmission lines due 
to the NE/SE separation. The bus voltage magnitudes and frequencies of these 38 buses 
are shown in Figure 4.17 and Figure 4.18 respectively. Similarly, the bus voltage 
magnitudes and frequencies of the 11-bus island are shown in Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20. 
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Figure 4.17 Voltage Magnitudes at 38 Buses of an Uncontrolled Island 
 
Figure 4.18 Frequency at 38 Buses of an Uncontrolled Island 
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Figure 4.19 Voltage Magnitudes at 11 Buses of an Uncontrolled Island 
 
Figure 4.20 Frequency at 11 Buses of an Uncontrolled Island 
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The frequency at these 11 buses does not show disruptive behavior. However, Figure 
4.15-Figure 4.17 show the collapse of voltage and frequency in these uncontrolled islands. 
It can be concluded that improper design of OOS blocking functions may lead to 
uncontrolled islanding, which in turn may result in voltage and frequency collapse in parts 
of the system. Finally, note that if the TOT2A RAS is not modelled, the results are similar 
to the results already presented above. Instead of the formation of 4 uncontrolled islands, 3 
uncontrolled islands are formed at roughly the same locations.  
4.5.4 Controlled islanding 
The simulated contingency, implemented distance relays, OOS tripping, and time 
sequence of the events are similar to Section 4.5.3. However, the OOS blocking function 
is implemented based on the minimum voltage evaluation method. Using this proposed 
method, all of the potential mis-operating relays, including the seven relays that mis-
operated using the projected relay trajectory method [32] in Section 4.5.3, are successfully 
detected. By implementing the OOS blocking functions for these transmission lines along 
with the OOS tripping functions, the system is divided into two controlled islands (north 
and south islands). None of the distance relays will mis-operate; each of the two islands 
stay connected and synchronized. The voltage magnitudes and frequencies of the 38 buses 
and 11 buses, which constitute uncontrolled islands in Section 4.5.3, are shown in Figure 
4.21- Figure 4.24. These buses stay connected to the rest of the system and their voltage 
magnitudes and frequencies show non-oscillatory and stable behavior at the end of the 
time horizon of the study. 
94 
 
 
Figure 4.21 Voltage Magnitudes at 38 Buses for Controlled Islanding Case 
 
Figure 4.22 Frequency at 38 Buses for Controlled Islanding Case  
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Figure 4.23 Voltage Magnitudes at 11 Buses for Controlled Islanding Case 
 
Figure 4.24 Frequency at 11 Buses for Controlled Islanding Case 
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Reference [8] indicates that a voltage dip in the range of 0.5 to 0.6 pu can be used to 
identify a power swing. Reference [8] explains that the buses that are close to the electrical 
center experience a voltage dip below 0.6 pu. The voltage magnitude profile for terminal 
buses of some of the transmission lines, which were recognized only by this proposed 
method (and not by the method [32]), are shown in Figure 4.25. As shown in these figures, 
the voltage magnitudes at these buses are compatible to the explanation of [8]. Similarly, 
other transmission lines, which were detected to be along the electrical center by the 
proposed method, satisfy this criterion. Note that there are cases where one bus voltage 
magnitude does not fall below 0.6 pu but still the line is along the electrical center. This 
confirms that the voltage dip screening method [8] requires more testing to be generalized. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 4.25 Bus Voltage Magnitudes for Buses Connected to the Potentially Mis-
operating Relays with Voltage Level: (a) 115 kV; (b) 230 kV; (c) 345 kV 
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4.6 Summary 
The impedance, which would be observed by the relay at the relay location, is studied 
in Section 4.1. A review of the literature for electrical center detection is presented in this 
chapter. Most of the presented methods in the literature are based on finding a two-
machine equivalent network. Each machine represents a coherent group of generators, 
which swing together with respect to the other generators. Such equivalent network 
methods require knowledge of the electrical center and the lines along that electrical 
center in advance, i.e., it requires knowing the two groups of generators that will form 
separate groups. Otherwise, the two groups of generators that are not in phase cannot be 
modeled as a single equivalent generator. Electrical center locations vary and need to be 
studied for various operational conditions, fault types, and fault locations. The challenge 
to complete multiple complex studies and the inaccuracy of the equivalent models are the 
primary causes of relay mis-operation. While this problem is well understood, the issue 
persists. 
Section 4.3 describes a new method, which is proposed within this dissertation. This 
method is based on finding and evaluating the minimum voltage through each 
transmission line at each time step of transient stability study. The proposed method of 
this dissertation and the method of [32], which is explained in Section 4.2.3, are tested on 
the WECC system. 
In general, the exact location of the electrical center is a function of the operational 
condition, network configuration, and last but not least, the contingency. Several transient 
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stability studies should be performed in order to find proper locations for OOS protection 
functions for each critical contingency.   
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Chapter 5: Identification of Critical Protection Functions for Time-Domain 
Simulations 
 
Lack of situational awareness is considered as one of the major causes of recent 
blackouts [44]-[47]. Improving situational awareness and observability is one of the key 
concerns of utilities and reliability coordinators. Inaccurate representation of power 
system assets in operation and planning software, lack of measurement data from 
unobservable parts of the system, and insufficient communication and coordination 
between associated operating entities are common factors of insufficient situational 
awareness in power systems [48].  
After a major event, the power system behavior is highly dependent on protection 
scheme behavior and system dynamics, which is governed by generators, loads, and 
control devices [49]. Improving situational awareness requires proper and simultaneous 
assessment of both of these aspects: protection scheme behavior and dynamic 
characteristics. Power system analysis that is conducted without adequate modeling of 
these two aspects may result in inaccurate assessment of system behavior during a 
contingency. One critical simulation tool where appropriate protection system modeling is 
essential, is positive sequence time domain transient stability analysis. Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation shows the impact of modeling protection schemes in transient stability study. 
The proper representation of protection functions in stability software has been a long 
term goal for utilities. The records from previous blackouts confirm the necessity of 
representing protective devices within transient stability studies.  
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Modeling all of the protective relays within transient stability studies may result in a 
better estimation of system behavior. However, representing, updating, and maintaining 
the protection system data within dynamic study data is an intractable task. 
Misrepresentation of the protective relays in transient stability software may result in 
incorrect assessment of the system behavior. Therefore, developing a method that can 
properly determine essential relays to be modeled within transient stability studies would 
be extremely useful and it would address a long-lasting unsolved problem. 
Previous research has developed strategies to identify the most vulnerable protective 
relays during a specific contingency. Reference [50] suggests that the transmission assets 
surrounding the faulted lines are the most vulnerable to hidden failures. Similarly, [51] 
proposes a strategy to identify the most vulnerable protection scheme by suggesting that 
the size of the vulnerable region depends on the size of the initiating event and the design 
of the protection schemes in the area surrounding this event. Reference [52] estimates the 
risk associated with the contingency in the vulnerable region of the initiating event. The 
vulnerable region and the vulnerable protection schemes in this prior work are identified 
based on the location and size of the initiating event. 
The initiating event may lead to several hidden failures, which exacerbate the system 
state and may result in more outages. This chain of events may threaten system operations 
far away from the initiating event and may lead to a system wide blackout. Therefore, only 
modeling vulnerable protective relays of the initiating event may result in inaccurate 
estimation of the system behavior in an emergency state. In order to obtain a more 
accurate assessment of the system behavior and to design better control mechanisms, all of 
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the vulnerable protective schemes, which may mis-operate during emergency states, need 
to be identified so that they can be adequately modeled and represented in dynamic 
simulation tools.  
The preferred methodology to identify vulnerable protective relays should specify 
relays that are critical for various operating conditions and contingencies. However, 
determining the critical relays for various operational transient conditions is a complex 
problem. Such a problem could be formulated as a stochastic mixed-integer non-linear 
program that would incorporate transient stability constraints. Given the complexity of this 
mathematical program, an exact algorithm is unlikely to be functional for large-scale 
systems. However, a heuristic strategy for this complex problem can be developed. 
Many prior research efforts propose clustering systems into groups for various 
applications such as controlled islanding or regional requirements for ancillary services. 
One potential strategy for identifying critical protective relays is to partition the system 
such that the critical distance relays are located at or near the boundaries of these groups. 
Groups may be identified based on generators that exhibit similar responses to 
disturbances. The relays along the defined cutsets of these groups are, thus, assumed to 
have a higher likelihood to mis-operate. 
Strategies to partition the power system include methods based on system 
characteristics, such as slow-coherency and eigenvalue analysis of the system dynamics 
[53]-[55], or based on measurements [56], [57]-[59]. Most of the previous partitioning 
approaches that are based on system characteristics mainly focus on the generator 
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coherency and do not incorporate load buses. Slow coherency is a physical indication of a 
weak connection [60] and is a viable solution for the problem of identifying critical relays. 
Reference [61] proposes a slow coherency method, which includes load buses. 
Reference [39] proposes software for controlled islanding based on slow coherency. 
Reference [40] tests the proposed slow coherency method in [39] on the Western 
Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) system. The proposed method of [39]-[40] is 
aimed at identifying a proper separation scheme. A similar strategy can be implemented in 
order to identify the critical protective relays. However, the slow coherency and cutset 
determination depend on the operating condition, i.e., [39] and [40] do not address this 
challenge regarding the determination of slowly coherent generator groups over a wide 
range of operational states.  
Moreover, [59] explains the application of fuzzy clustering for power system 
coherency partitioning. It is explained that fuzzy clustering employs a soft partitioning 
strategy, meant to provide more flexible clusters relative to the inherent data structure. 
Reference [59] proposes to use fuzzy c-means (FCM) clustering analysis, which uses the 
coherency measure as a basis for classification. A flexible partitioning strategy may be 
more appropriate for the problem of identifying critical relays as the desired method 
should identify all critical relays for various operational conditions and contingencies. 
There are two main drawbacks with the prior research, which make them less suitable 
for the problem of identifying critical distance relays: 1) the majority of the previous 
research efforts aim at categorizing the system for a specific operating condition and/or 
contingency. Such approaches are not even guaranteed to identify the critical relays for 
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that particular condition or contingency due to the inability to precisely predict load, 
generator dispatch, voltage control, planned outages, or even other remedial action 
schemes. 2) Most of the previous approaches group only generators (generators buses). 
Therefore, other buses will not be allocated to any specific group, which does not 
adequately address the problem of determining the cutset across critical transmission lines 
in order to identify the critical and vulnerable protective relays. 
Several previous research efforts aim at identifying various partitions (also referred to 
as zones) based on the network structure. References [62] and [63] specify various zones 
in the power system based on power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) values. Buses that 
have similar impacts on transmission lines are considered to be in the same zone. The 
specified zones are used for determining reserve sharing policies and dynamic reserve 
requirements. If such a strategy were to be implemented in order to find critical protective 
relays, the distance relays located on the transmission lines, which connect the buses of 
various zones, are the critical distance relays. 
Similarly, a strategy may leverage line outage distribution factors (LODF). Lines that 
have high LODFs with regards to critical contingencies, e.g., the California-Oregon 
Intertie (COI) in the WECC, can be considered to have critical relays. 
This dissertation proposes a network partitioning strategy for the problem of 
identifying vulnerable protective relays for various operating states [64]. The proposed 
method uses a collection of features related to the previously discussed strategies. Due to 
the complexity in the nature of the problem of interest, a heuristic strategy is implemented 
to identify the critical relays. Many other heuristic strategies, other than what is proposed 
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here, can be used in order to address this problem. The proposed strategy is a mixed-
integer linear program (MILP) based on prior generator grouping information of critical 
contingencies and network structure. This proposed strategy can be implemented during 
offline planning studies to identify critical protective relays to be modeled in transient 
stability analysis.  
5.1 Network partitioning to identify critical protective relays 
After the initiating event, a power swing may result in relay mis-operations. These 
relays need to be identified and equipped with out-of-step (OOS) blocking schemes [65]. 
However, any additional forced outage may expose a different situation on the system and 
result in a vulnerability of a different set of protective relays. These vulnerabilities and 
mis-operating cases cannot be identified without analyzing transient stability results while 
modeling critical protective relays.  
This dissertation proposes a method to identify the critical distance relays, which are 
prone to mis-operate during various operating conditions and contingencies. In order to 
improve situational awareness, it is crucial to identify and model these protective relays 
during transient stability studies. The desired strategy should identify any distance relays, 
which may be affected by any power swing in a given system. Such a strategy can be 
implemented in offline long-term planning studies in order to identify the protective 
relays, which need to be modeled in transient stability studies during short-term 
operational study purposes, e.g., real-time security assessment tools. 
A network partitioning strategy based on a MILP model is proposed here for the 
problem of identifying vulnerable protective relays. Two main characteristics of power 
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systems are used in this proposed strategy: 1) the generators’ grouping pattern and 2) the 
transmission network (structure and impedance). The generators’ grouping pattern can be 
obtained from historical data of critical contingencies, if such information is available, or 
from results of initial transient stability studies for critical contingencies. The transmission 
network characteristic is captured through shift factors, i.e., PTDF. These two 
characteristics are captured through the objective function of this network partitioning 
model. 
The objective of this model is to group generators that show similar system responses 
to a disturbance. With the generator groupings defined, the protective relays connecting 
these groups are identified as the critical relays to monitor in transient stability studies. To 
accomplish this goal, the proposed approach uses the generator grouping information from 
one or several critical contingencies and a given operating condition as an input. This 
grouping information is considered in the form of penalizing the allocation of the 
generator buses, which were grouped together, in different partitions of the network.  
In addition, a different metric needs to be used to allocate non-generator buses to 
different groups. This proposed strategy uses a PTDF based criterion similar to [62]-[63] 
to allocate the buses, which have similar impacts on the transmission network, to the same 
partition. This criterion, which is shown in (5.1), is based on comparing the average 
impact of injections at any two buses on all transmission lines. Note that, 
R
m,k
R
n,k
PTDFPTDF −  is the same as 
m
n,k
PTDF ; equation (5.1) is based on the 
calculation of the PTDF for a given reference bus R. 
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The proposed network partitioning strategy, depicted by (5.2)-(5.12), identifies the 
critical protective relays. Generator grouping information from one or several critical 
contingencies and (5.1) is incorporated through the objective function, (5.2). This model is 
a MILP model with two functions in the objective, which are weighted by the coefficients, 
α and β . The binary variable 1Xin =  specifies that bus n  belongs to group i . 0Xin =  
identifies that bus n  does not belong to group i . ir  is the predefined reference bus for 
group i , which imposes that i
ir
X  must equal 1. This is equivalent to giving each group at 
least one member bus as a start. The choice of which bus to put within a group must be 
driven by engineering insight; however, it is often not too difficult, based on prior 
knowledge or simulations, to identify a few buses that should be included in different 
groups.  
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The first element in the objective applies a penalty if two generator buses, which were 
grouped together in offline analysis (historical data of outages, hypothetical simulation 
results, or expert opinion), were forced to be in separate groups by the MILP model. With 
a positive coefficient in the objective for a minimization problem and with only lower 
bounds for m,nλ , the MILP problem will push m,nλ  to its greatest lower bound. Constraint 
(5.4) imposes a lower bound of 1 whenever the two generators are in different groups; 
(5.4) will impose a lower bound of 0 when the generators are in the same group. Thus, 
1m,n =λ  only when the two generator buses are placed in different groups. Note that (5.4) 
is only defined for generator buses.  
The value of α and β  are general scaling factors. However, cm,nC  can be used based 
on various strategies. For instance, if historical data places buses n  and m  in the same 
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group frequently, the model user may wish to make the value of cm,nC  high. On the other 
hand, if buses n  and m  rarely show up together in the offline analysis, a much lower 
value for cm,nC  may be chosen, even a value of zero. For this dissertation, 
c
m,nC  is chosen to 
be zero or one; a value of zero is given unless two buses were in the same group based on 
the offline analysis.    
Equations (5.5)-(5.6), along with the second term in the objective, encourage buses to 
be assigned in the same group if they have a similar impact on the transmission network. 
Linear shift factors (PTDF) are used to estimate the impact of an injection at bus n  
relative to the impact on the network for an injection at bus m . These shift factors are the 
well-known dc-based PTDFs, not ac-based PTDFs, which still adequately capture the 
general impact of an injection at a bus without getting into more precise analysis regarding 
the actual operating case.  
Equation (5.7) identifies and forces each bus to belong to just one of the groups. 
Equation (5.8) allocates a predetermined bus ( ir  is the initial bus, the reference bus, for 
group i ) to each group. The role of (5.8) is important to the success of the proposed 
approach. For instance, for a known outage at a critical transmission interface, historical 
data or simulation would show that the separation of the system will start around the 
interface. Even though those buses are generally close to each other and have very similar 
impacts on the transmission network (for injections at their locations), after the outage of 
the interface, they belong to different islands. Therefore, (5.8) guides the MILP model to a 
solution based on engineering judgement, leveraging insight based upon forcing a bus to 
be assigned to a particular group. Of course, additional constraints can be added to force 
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other buses to be assigned to a particular group. This may be beneficial for large-scale 
systems that are hard to solve and when there is a high confidence that certain buses will 
be grouped together. For this dissertation, there is only one bus initially assigned to each 
group and all other buses are free to be assigned to any group, based on the MILP 
solution.  
Equations (5.9)-(5.10) are node-balance constraints and (5.11), combined with (5.9)-
(5.10), ensure a connectivity requirement for each group. The difference between (5.9) and 
(5.10) is that the node-balance constraint for each group’s reference bus includes an 
additional term on the left hand side, as can be seen from (5.9); the summation over inX  
for all n  calculates the number of buses assigned to group i . This summation term 
represents an injection equal to the number of buses in group i  while the right hand side 
of (5.9) and (5.10) include a demand based on inX  if bus n  is assigned to group i . Both 
(5.9) and (5.10) include summation terms for the net injections and withdrawals associated 
to line transfers to complete the node-balance constraints. The reference bus applies an 
injection equal to the number of buses assigned to the group; the lines transmit the 
reference bus injection to the buses assigned to the group. Essentially, (5.9) and (5.10) 
combine to create node-balance constraints for all buses in the network, for each group. 
Constraint (5.11) shows that each branch can be assigned to a group if and only if both the 
to bus and the from bus of the branch are in the same group; (5.11) imposes that 
i
k
l  equals 
zero if either the to bus or the from bus is not a part of group i . Constraint (5.11) allows 
i
k
l  to take on a large positive or negative value if both the to bus and the from bus are a 
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part of group i . The M  value is set to a large number so that (5.11) is non-binding if 
1XX i
tok
i
fromk
== . This is known as a big M reformulation where a large multiplier is 
selected to allow the constraints to be inactive whenever it is not supposed to be binding 
[66]. Equation (5.12) states that the variable must be binary. Together, (5.7)-(5.12) ensure 
that each bus is assigned to one group and that each group has no islanded buses, i.e., a 
connectivity requirement for each grouping.  
The transmission lines, which are the links between different groups, form the solution 
cutset of the network partitioning model. It is proposed that the distance relays along the 
cutset as well as all of the neighboring lines should be modeled during transient stability 
studies. It is crucial to model the neighboring lines of the specified cutset in transient 
stability studies as distance relays of any of these transmission lines may mis-operate 
during slightly different operational conditions. 
5.2 Numerical results and analysis 
The proposed method is tested on the IEEE 145-bus and the WECC 179-bus test 
cases. Each test case is an equivalent WECC model. Power System Simulator for 
Engineering (PSS/E) [67] was used for the transient stability analysis. The proposed MILP 
strategy is implemented in JAVA. CPLEX 12.5 is used as the solver. 
For both test cases, a transient stability study is performed for the original operating 
condition along with a contingency that results in an unstable power swing. The generator 
groups are identified using the result of this study. The proposed strategy is applied for 
each of the test cases using the generator grouping information from the initial transient 
stability study.  
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In order to test the results of the proposed strategy, distance relays are defined on all 
lines using a model from PSS/E, i.e., DISTR1 [67]. Out-of-sample testing is performed for 
various operating conditions and contingencies for each of the test cases. The results of 
transient stability studies, while modeling distance relays on all transmission lines, are 
compared with the case of modeling only the distance relays identified by the proposed 
approach. The details of these two test cases, and the corresponding results and analysis of 
results, are presented in Section 5.2.1 and Section 5.2.2.  
5.2.1 WECC 179-bus test case 
The system includes 179 buses, 29 generators, 203 transmission lines, and 60 
transformers. The load is about 54 GW. Figure 5.1 shows this test system.  
The initial transient stability study is performed for the described operating condition. 
A fault is modeled at bus 83, which represents bus MALIN in the WECC system. It is 
assumed that the fault causes outages on three transmission lines: 83-89, 83-94, and 83-98. 
These outages, which represent the outage of the COI in the WECC, result in an unstable 
power swing. A transient stability study is performed for 10 seconds. During this unstable 
power swing, the generators divide into 5 groups.  
Note that the coefficients α , β  are to be set by the operator in order to achieve 
efficiency of the proposed method. The proposed method is tested for various values of α , 
β  in order to evaluate the sensitivity of the results to these values. The protective relays on 
transmission assets along the cutsets identified by the proposed method, and their 
neighboring lines, are considered as the critical protective relays to be modeled in the 
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transient stability study. Moreover, two methods of identifying neighboring lines are 
tested.  
 
Figure 5.1 WECC 179-bus Test Case 
Various values of (α, β ) are tested: (1000,1), (10,1), (5,1), (1,1), (0.5,10), (1,10), and 
(1,100). The results show that whenever the first part of the objective (related to α ) is 
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scaled higher, a consistent set of transmission assets are identified as critical. On the other 
hand, if the second part of objective (related to β ) is scaled higher, a different set of 
transmission lines is consistently identified as the cutset. Conservatively, all transmission 
lines for these two sets, along with their neighboring transmission lines, are identified as 
critical lines. The protective relays, which protect these transmission lines, are critical and 
need to be modeled within transient stability.  
Next, various neighboring strategies are tested: 
Strategy 1: All of the transmission lines of the identified cutset, along with their 
neighbors, were considered as critical transmission lines. Moreover, all of the transmission 
lines, which are in a series connection with any of the critical transmission lines, are 
considered to be critical. In total, 53 transmission lines were identified as critical 
transmission lines.  
Strategy 2: All of the lines along the identified cutset as well as the transmission lines 
that are within 2 buses of the cutset are considered as critical transmission lines. This 
strategy represents consideration of the neighboring lines and the zone 3 reach point of 
their distance relays. In total, 62 transmission lines were identified as critical transmission 
lines. 
Using Strategy 1 and Strategy 2, only 33% and 39% of the distance relays are 
identified as critical relays to be modeled in transient stability study respectively. Note that 
these percentage values are calculated using the total number of distance relays. Distance 
relays are not modeled for the equivalent transmission lines, i.e., lines with negative 
resistance. Representation, updating, and maintaining the protection system data of such a 
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low percentage of distance relays (33% or 39% of total distance relays) increases the 
efficiency, reduces the chance of misrepresentation of the protective systems, and helps 
avoid the inaccurate estimation of system behavior.  
In order to validate the proposed method, a transient stability study is conducted while 
modeling distance relays on all transmission lines (except the equivalent lines), 158 
transmission lines. The results are compared with the results of a transient stability study 
while modeling the 33% of relays identified by Strategy 1.  
A total of 316 distance relays are defined, which protect both sides of 158 transmission 
lines. The zone 1, zone 2, and zone 3 of the distance relays are considered to be 0.85, 1.25, 
and 1.5 times the transmission line impedance respectively. Operating time of zone 1 is set 
to 1 cycle [68]. Zone 2 and zone 3 of the distance relays operate with delay of 0.3 and 2 
seconds respectively. The breaker operation time is modeled to be 0.03 seconds. Although 
the protective relay settings vary for different transmission lines, these relay settings are 
assumed to be similar for all transmission lines due to the lack of data for protection 
systems. Please note that OOS protection is not defined for these distance relays in order 
to study the effects of mis-operation of these relays. Although OOS blocking schemes 
provide another layer of protection for mis-operation of the related distance relays, it is 
important to monitor these distance relays carefully through transient stability studies as 
those relays are likely to be exposed to power swings. 
In order to validate whether the proposed strategy is able to successfully identify 
critical relays for transient stability studies, transient stability studies are performed for 
two operating conditions and various contingencies. Table 5.1 shows the various in-
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sample and out-of-sample cases, which are tested in order to validate the proposed 
strategy. The two tested operating conditions are Case 1 and Case 2. The load level in 
Case 2 is 20% more than the load in Case 1.  
Table 5.1 Tested Scenarios and Operating Conditions for WECC 179-bus Test Case 
 Tested Contingencies 
Case 1 
Outage of transmission line 28-29 
Outage of transmission line 86-1 
Outage of transmission line 86-88 
Outage of transmission line 16-136 
Outage of transmission line 12-139 
Outage of transmission line 81-99 
Outages of transmission lines 83-89, 83-94, 83-98 
Case 2 
Outages of transmission lines 83-89, 83-94, 83-98 
Outage of transmission line 82-91 
Outage of transmission line 28-29 
Outage of two transmission lines 64-139 
Outage of transmission line 142-147 
Fault at bus 83 
Fault at bus 86 
Fault at bus 139 
 
The results of transient stability study, while modeling all protective relays, show that 
a total of 25 transmission lines were tripped during these cases. All of these 25 
transmission lines were identified by Strategy 1 and Strategy 2. Therefore, if transient 
stability is performed while modeling only the relays identified by Strategy 1 and Strategy 
2, the transient stability results are similar to modeling all relays. 
In addition, the results of a transient stability study, while modeling all of the 316 
distance relays, are compared with the results of a transient stability study while modeling 
106 distance relays of Strategy 1. For this study, a bus fault is modeled at bus 86 for four 
cycles. It is presumed that this fault results in an outage of line from bus 86 to bus 88. In 
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addition, other distance relays operate while this fault is present in the system. Mis-
operation of these relays reduces the transfer capability from the eastern side of the 
network, which is shown in Figure 5.1. At 1.5 seconds, the generator at bus 36 loses 
synchronism. The distance relays on the line 85-156, which is exposed to this loss of 
synchronism (OOS condition), mis-operate. The loss of synchronism and the relay mis-
operations exacerbate the system condition resulting in additional generators slipping 
poles. At around 4.5 seconds, the generator at bus 35 loses synchronism, which results in 
mis-operation of distance relays on transmission line 31-32. Finally, the generators on the 
northwestern part of the network (generators at buses 30, 65, 70, 77, and 79) lose 
synchronism with the rest of the system. The loss of synchronism of these generators 
results in mis-operation of the distance relays on the transmission lines at around 6.8 
seconds. This process is exactly the same for both cases: a) modeling all 316 distance 
relays; b) modeling 106 identified distance relays. In both of these cases, the same 
distance relays trigger at the same time step of the transient stability study. Figure 5.2 and 
Figure 5.3 show the generators’ relative rotor angles for the two cases. 
Similarly, transient stability studies are performed for a fault at bus 83, which is 
followed by outages of transmission lines 83-89, 83-94, and 83-98. Figure 5.4 and Figure 
5.5 show the generators relative rotor angles while modeling all distance relays and 33% 
distance relays respectively.  
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Figure 5.2 Generators Relative Rotor Angles: (i) WECC 179-bus Case; (ii) Outage 
of Line 86-88; (iii) All Distance Relays Modeled 
 
Figure 5.3 Generators Relative Rotor Angles: (i) WECC 179-bus Case; (ii) Outage 
of Line 86-88; (iii) Only Identified Distance Relays Modeled 
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Figure 5.4 Generators Relative Rotor Angles: (i) WECC 179-bus Case; (ii) Outage 
of Lines 83-89, 83-94, and 83-98; (iii) All Distance Relays Modeled 
 
Figure 5.5 Generators Relative Rotor Angles: (i) WECC 179-bus Case; (ii) Outage 
of Lines 83-89, 83-94, and 83-98; (iii) Only Identified Distance Relays Modeled 
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These figures confirm that modeling only identified distance relays of the proposed 
method (33% of total relays) produce similar results in comparison to modeling all 
distance relays. As a result of the initiating event (fault and outages of lines 83-89, 83-94, 
and 83-98), the generators in the northern area (generators at buses 36, 30, 65, 79, 77, and 
70) lose synchronism and slip poles. In addition, the generators, which are located south of 
these lines (generators at buses 112, 116, and 118) lose their power transfer path to load 
and slip poles. At around 2.2 seconds, the generator at bus 36 loses synchronism with its 
group (northern group) and slip poles. This loss of synchronism results in the tripping of 
lines 81-99 and 85-156. Moreover, the generator at bus 35 loses synchronism in both 
cases, which results in the loss of line 31-32. At around 3.4 seconds, the eastern and 
western sides of the network lose synchronism followed by the outage of line 28-29. This 
process is exactly the same in both studies conducted, i.e., modeling all distance relays and 
modeling 33% of distance relays. 
5.2.2 IEEE 145-bus test case 
This test case is shown in [69] and consists of 145 buses, 50 generators, 402 
transmission lines, and 53 transformers. The demand in this system is 283 GW. An initial 
transient stability study is performed for the original operating condition. A fault is 
modeled at bus 7, which results in the outage of transmission line 6-7. As a result of this 
fault and outage, the generators divide to three synchronous groups. For this test case, (α,
β ) are set at (100, 1). The identified transmission lines along with their neighboring 
relays are considered as the critical protective relays to be modeled in the transient 
stability study. Using this strategy, 65% of total distance relays are identified as the critical 
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relays; note that the calculation of the 65% does not involve equivalence lines (and their 
corresponding relays) in the network (lines with negative resistance). 
In order to validate the proposed strategy, the transient stability study is performed 
while modeling all protective relays; the results of this test are compared with the results 
of a transient stability study while modeling just 65% identified distance relays. In order to 
test the proposed strategy, the distance relays with settings similar to Section 5.2.1 are 
modeled on all of the transmission lines of this test case. 
Transient stability studies are performed for three operating conditions and various 
contingencies. Table 5.2 summarizes the tests. The operating conditions in Case 1, Case 2, 
and Case 3 consist of the original load condition, 75% of the original load level, and 125% 
of the original load level respectively. 
Table 5.2 Tested Scenarios and Operating Condition for IEEE 145-bus Test Case 
 Tested Contingencies 
Case 1 
Outage of transmission line 6-7 
Outages of transmission lines 1-2 and 1-6 
Outages of two transmission lines 25-27 
Outages of two transmission lines 6-12 
Outage of transmission line 102-117 
Case 2 
Outage of transmission line 6-7 
Outages of transmission lines 1-2 and 1-6 
Outages of two transmission lines 25-27 
Outages of two transmission lines 6-12 
Outage of transmission line 102-117 
Case 3 
Outage of transmission line 6-7 
Outages of transmission lines 1-2 and 1-6 
Outages of two transmission lines 25-27 
Outages of two transmission lines 6-12 
Outage of transmission line 102-117 
The results confirm that the proposed strategy is able to successfully identify all mis-
operating relays for the tested operating conditions and contingencies. Figure 5.6 and 
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Figure 5.7 show the generators relative rotor angles for Case 3 and a fault at bus 1, which 
is cleared by opening lines 1-2 and 1-6. After the initial event, the generators located at 
buses 93 and 99, lose synchronism with the rest of the system, which causes relay mis-
operation for lines: 49-51, 50-51, and 58-87. As a result of this mis-operation, the 
northwestern part separates from the rest of the system. As shown in Figure 5.6 and 
Figure5.7, the results are the same while modeling only the identified distance relays (65% 
of relays) or all relays. Therefore, based on the presented empirical results, the proposed 
strategy is able to successfully identify the critical protective relays. The proposed strategy 
can be implemented offline during a power system planning phase in order to identify the 
set of protective relays, which are critical to model during transient stability studies. 
 
Figure 5.6 Generators Relative Rotor Angles: (i) IEEE 145-bus Case; (ii) Outages of 
Lines 1-2 and 1-6; (iii) All Distance Relays Modeled 
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Figure 5.7 Generators Relative Rotor Angles: (i) IEEE 145-bus Case; (ii) Outages of 
Lines 1-2 and 1-6; (iii) Only Identified Distance Relays Modeled 
5.3 Summary 
This chapter emphasizes the importance of modeling protection function within 
transient stability study tools. It is explained that mis-representation of protective relays in 
power systems analysis tool may result in inaccurate estimation of system behavior. 
Therefore, a strategy that can selectively identify critical protective relays to be modeled 
in transient stability study is very useful. This chapter proposes a strategy that, based on 
empirical evidence, has successfully identified the critical protective relays, which may be 
exposed to power swings for various operating conditions and contingencies. These 
protective relays are the critical protective schemes that need to be modeled within 
transient stability study tools. The proposed strategy is a network partition model, which is 
framed as an MILP. The generators’ grouping information and transmission network are 
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considered as inputs for the proposed strategy. The proposed strategy is validated through 
out-of-sample testing for various operating conditions and contingencies on the WECC 
179-bus and the IEEE 145-bus test cases. The transient stability results show that 
modeling only the identified protective relays of the proposed strategy produces the same 
results as modeling all of the protective relays. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Work 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
Accurate stability studies are a fundamental component to obtain a proper assessment 
of system behavior. Only when the system behavior is properly modeled in stability 
simulation tools is it possible to identify the critical control actions necessary to maintain 
reliable and secure operations of the electric power grid. While this fact is well-established 
and widely recognized for decades, there are still rudimentary limitations with existing 
power systems modeling procedures for stability analysis. One essential limitation that 
still exists is the lack of representation of automated protection schemes even though they 
have existed for decades.   
This dissertation addresses the following critical research and practical challenges 
associated to the identification and representation of protection systems in stability studies. 
First, this dissertation starts with the investigation and verification of the importance of 
modeling protection systems during transient stability studies, including out-of-step 
conditions. The results have clearly confirmed the critical nature of accurate protection 
system modeling within stability studies. Second, this dissertation proposes a method to 
identify the proper locations of out-of-step blocking schemes in order to prevent relay mis-
operations during unstable power swings. Third, the proposed method then enables the 
avoidance of unintentional islanding during unstable power swings. Finally, this 
dissertation also proposes a methodology to identify which protection systems are critical 
to model within stability studies. Due to the cumbersome task of trying to maintain 
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accurate data for all protection systems along with maintaining accurate models of those 
protection systems within stability studies, it is critical to identify the key subset of 
protection systems that should be accurately modeled within stability studies. 
The occurrence of power swings during critical events is one key reason why the 
modeling of protection systems in stability studies is important. Severe and sudden 
changes in the state of the system may result in stable or unstable power swings. During 
unstable power swings, mis-operation of relays may cause a system wide blackout. Prior 
historical data recorded during cascading events further confirm the substantial influence 
of relay mis-operation. Large blackouts often include multiple relay mis-operations which 
cause further stress on the system and are a main cause of the blackout. Therefore, it is 
critical to study power system behavior during power swings while also having a proper 
representation of the various protection systems. Such representation is important not just 
for operations but also for planning studies.   
Out-of-step protection schemes, both for transmission and generators, are designed to 
perform appropriate control actions during unstable power swings. Out-of-step protection 
systems should be designed accurately in order to help prevent a system collapse. Both 
out-of-step tripping and out-of-step blocking functions should be placed and designed 
properly during the planning stage and adjusted, as needed, for actual operations. While 
the need for proper out-of-step protection schemes is well-known, there are two 
fundamental challenges: a) to identify the critical locations and functionality of the out-of-
step protection schemes and b) to maintain a proper up-to-date dataset and characteristic 
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models of all protection schemes for stability studies. The presented work addresses both 
of these critical challenges. 
This dissertation has proposed a methodology to determine the proper locations of out-
of-step blocking relays. During power swings, a generator or group of generators may slip 
poles. This condition causes angular separation between different areas of the system. 
When the two individually synchronized systems become separated by 180 degrees, the 
voltage magnitude may drop to zero on some transmission lines connecting the separated 
area; the identified location is known as the electrical center. In order to avoid mis-
operation of the related relays, these relays should be temporarily blocked from tripping. 
These potentially mis-operating relays during a power swing should be recognized during 
planning studies and appropriate out-of-step blocking relays should be located along these 
lines.  
Most of the methods presented in literature are based on approximating the system 
with a two-source equivalent network. These methods are neither accurate nor appropriate 
for large power systems; such approaches are also not appropriate for studies involving the 
modeling of protection systems. More recent research proposes a fast and innovative 
electrical center detection method [32], which is not based on a two-source equivalent 
network approximation. This method utilizes results of a transient stability study in order 
to evaluate whether the swing impedance characteristic intersects the line impedance. 
However, this method is not able to detect all of the mis-operating relays properly. The 
deficiency of the proposed method of [32] is shown in this dissertation. 
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This research proposes a method that is able to detect stable and unstable power 
swings within transient stability studies. Moreover, this method can be easily used in 
power system planning studies to identify the necessary locations for the OOS blocking 
functions. The proposed method is based on evaluating the minimum voltage through each 
transmission line for each time interval of the transient stability study. The minimum 
voltage evaluation method is tested on peak summer data from the WECC. The proposed 
method is also compared to the projected relay trajectory method [32]. The results show 
that the proposed method is able to detect the potential mis-operating relays correctly. 
The proposed method also augments and enhances the remedial action scheme 
associated with the COI outage. The OOS blocking scheme based on the proposed 
method, along with the NE/SE separation scheme, provides a proper controlled islanding 
scheme. 
In addition, the results show that the proposed method is less sensitive to the network 
topology in comparison to prior approaches, e.g., [32]. It can be concluded that assessing 
the voltage drop is a reliable method to detect the electrical center. Results further confirm 
that if the blocking only occurs for the relays where their relay impedance trajectories 
intersect the line impedance, uncontrolled islanding may still occur.  
Moreover, the voltage dip screening strategy, which is explained by NERC [8], 
confirms the accuracy of the proposed method. The conducted studies indicate that OOS 
relays have to be designed with great care. Failure to detect all mis-operating relays may 
result in failure of the islanding scheme and may lead to a system wide collapse.  
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This research identifies a solution for distance relay mis-operation during unstable 
power swings. Overall, a range of operating conditions and disturbances must be analyzed 
to design protection systems. Such cases require extensive testing via simulations to verify 
that the designed settings work effectively and protect the system following disturbances. 
This dissertation also addresses the second main challenge, identifying which relays 
are critical to model within transient stability studies. The historical analysis of blackouts 
confirms the importance of modeling protective relays within power system transient 
stability analysis. However, representing, maintaining, and updating data for all protective 
relays is an intractable task. Misrepresentation or outdated representation of protective 
relays may result in inaccurate estimation of system behavior in critical emergency states. 
Empirical results confirm that the proposed method successfully identifies the critical 
protective relays, which may be exposed to power swings for various operating conditions 
and contingencies. These protective relays are the critical protective schemes that need to 
be modeled within transient stability study tools. The proposed strategy is a network 
partition model, which is framed as an MILP. The generators’ grouping information and 
transmission network are considered as inputs for the proposed strategy. The generator 
grouping information can either be obtained from historical data related to the previous 
critical contingency or from the result of a transient stability study for an initial critical 
contingency. The protective relays, which are located along the identified cutsets and their 
neighboring relays, are considered as critical protective relays to be modeled in transient 
stability study tools. Various strategies for identifying neighboring relays have been 
implemented and tested.  
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The proposed strategy is validated through out-of-sample testing for various operating 
conditions and contingencies on the WECC 179-bus and the IEEE 145-bus test cases. The 
results confirm that the proposed strategy is able to identify all of the mis-operating relays 
of various operating conditions and contingencies. 
Furthermore, transient stability results are compared for the cases when all protective 
relays are modeled and when only the critical relays identified by the proposed strategy 
are modeled. This comparison shows that modeling only the identified protective relays of 
the proposed strategy produces the same results as modeling all of the protective relays. 
This confirms the accuracy and efficiency of the proposed strategy.  
The proposed method can be implemented in the offline planning process. Therefore, 
solution time is not a restrictive metric and the proposed strategy can be scaled for large-
scale systems. Additional modifications, such as clustering generators with similar 
responses, and/or implementing a weighting factor for the high voltage transmission lines 
to be selected in the cutset, can be added to the proposed method. 
6.2 Future work 
This dissertation proposes two strategies for the problems of: a) identification of mis-
operating relays for unstable power swings; b) identification of critical protection 
functions for time-domain simulations. Both of these two strategies mainly focus on 
distance relays. Similar strategies should be developed for any other transmission 
protective schemes, which observe power swings.  
Moreover, both of these strategies focus on inter-area power swings. Therefore, these 
methods are aimed at relays, that protect transmission assets. During a local power swing, 
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the protective relays, which protect the generators and their step-up transformers, may 
observe the power swing. Similarly, a strategy can be developed in order to identify which 
specific protective relays would observe local power swings and may operate or mis-
operate. The desired strategy should identify critical protective relays, which their 
operation would impact the results of transient stability studies. 
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